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This thesis examines the appropriateness and viability of
applying a program of Planned Community Economic Development
to the Boston Chinese Community. Planned Community Economic
Development, as the term is used here, refers to the process
by which a community acquires and invests scarce resources in
those activities generating benefits which maximize the com-
munities social welfare as defined by the community
through the political process.
In determining the appropriateness and viability of such
aaprogram both the "real" and "legitimate" needs for econo.
mically developing the Boston Chinese Community are specified.
The focus of the discussion then shifts to identifying tenta-
tive investment opportunities for both business and land deve-
lopment. Adopting the position that opportunities for invest-
ment are sufficient in both areas the study goes on to identify
potential sources of investment resources which can be tapped
to finance a program of Planned Community Economic Development.
Because of the general misconception of Chinese dommunities
as problemless, model-minority communities the primary emphasis
of this thesis is to establish that, in fact, the Boston Chinese
Community is confronted with problems as severe as those threa-
tening other urban ghettoes and therefore is in need of econo-
mic developmental assistance.
Thesis Supervisor: Bennett Harrison
Title: Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION:
Similar problems that have elicited much public atten-
tion and concern in other urban ghettoes have been relatively
ignored and neglected in the Boston Chinese Community. Rela-
tively obscure and apparently troubleless, the Boston Chinese
Community has not been generally recognized as constituting
an urban ghetto, at least not in the full vernacular sense of
the word. Yet beneath the surface of seeming calm and tran-
quility lie smoldering a number of problems, which if allowed
to reach maturation, threaten to engulf the community in the
same social pathologies that perpetuate and are perpetuated
by other urban ghettoes. This ominous prediction is not merely
idle prophesy but has its precedence in other Chinese communi-
ties: most notably in New York and San Francisco Chinatowns.
The Boston Chinese community is evolving in a pattern which is
discernibly and disquietingly similar to that followed by her
sister communities.
Forewarned by the experiences of other Chinatowns Boston's
Chinese Community,has in recent yearsbegun to mobilize efforts
to revitalize the community and to deal with the problems con-
fronting the community in a meaningful way before they grow to
unmanageable proportions. As an intergral part of these revi-
talization efforts the community has recognized the need for
internal economic development.
Recognizing that economic development of the community
can assume different forms, this thesis will present a case
for what shall be designated "Planned Community Economic
Page 9
Development". Yfore specifically, it is the objective of this
thesis to examine and document both the needs and tentative
potentials for and of Planned Community Economic Development
of the Boston Chinese Community. The thesis is divided into
three parts.
In Part I a brief description of the Boston Chinese
Community will be given. A primary geographic impact area
will be defined and relevant information to that area pre-
sented.
In Part II a case justifying the need for Planned Com-
munity Economic Development of the Boston Chinese Community
will be presented. First, a scenario of the major problems
confronting the community will be outlined which will justi-
fy the need for economic development as being "real". Once
the "real" need has been established the focus of the dis-
cussion will then shift to the issue of whether or not econo-
mic development is indeed the appropriate response and solu-
tion to the problems enumerated--that is whether or not the
need for economic development of the community is "legitimate"
in the sense of being the most effective and efficient means
of enhancing the welfare of community residents and the com-
munity as a whole. The final chapter of Part II will deal
with Planned Community Economic Development as a distinct
mode of economic development. In this chapter Planned Com-
munity Economic Development will be defined and a rationale
offered as to why Planned Community Economic Development
is deemed to be the most appropriate form of economi.ic develop-
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ment in dealing with the problems giving rise to urban Chinese
ghettoes.
In the final section, Part III, potentials for investment
through which economic development is to be generated will be
examined. Investment opportunities in venture enterprises and
land development will be especially focused upon. Potentials
for financing Planned Community Economic Development will also
be discussed briefly within the specific context of the Boston
Chinese Community.
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PART I
DESCRIPTION OF THE
BOSTON CHINESE COMMUNITY
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CHAPTER I: DEFINING THE BOSTON CHINESE COMMUNITY
The "community" for which economic development is main-
tained to be necessary will henceforth be referred to as the
"Boston Chinese Community" (BCC). Unlike most communities
the BCC is not so much defined by geographic boundaries as by
the ethnicity of its members. The BCC is a particularly amor-
phous entity for which geographic criteria of proximity and
concentration in space, commonly used to define communities,
have little meaning. To delineate the boundaries demarcating
the BCC would be extrememly difficult if not impossible. The
BCC has tended to evolve in physically isolated "clusters" and
therefore, not being contiguous in space, is not amenable to
being defined geographically.
Although the BCC is physically disjointed it has managed
to maintain a very strong individual social identity and cha-
racter. The members of the BCC are bound together by a common
set of problems that arise from language and cultural barriers.
Unlike many other ethnic minorities who have immigrated to the
United States the Chinese are not able to benefit from the miti-
gating influences of being able to draw upon the commonalities
of western traditions and values in the process of adjusting
to the customs and life styles of the host society.In the face
of fonidable barriers that prevent them from joining the main-
stream of American life many Chinese have been forced to with-
draw into their own closed societies. Only among their own do
many Chinese find a sanctuary and haven from the often "incom-
prehensible" outside world.
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Insulated from the world the BCC has become a society
within a society. It supports a rich subculture and maintains
its own set of institutions and rules of conduct. It is at
the same time part ofand yet separate from,the host society.
As such it has, in effect, developed its own urban spatial
structure: one that can perhaps best be characterized as re-
sembling a "solar system" with a single regional center
(Chinatown) around which gravitates a number of smaller satel-
lite residential and business settlements.
Although the economic strategies to be presented later
are designed to affect a geographically dispersed Chinese popu-
lation it is expected that the major developmental efforts will
be concentrated in what shall be designated as "Chinatown Pro-
per". Chinatown Proper is presently the heart of the BCC
(see Exhibit 1). It is here that the major economic, social,
and cultural activities of the BC are located. Chinatown
Proper consists of three major sub-areas; the "Business and
Commercial Core", the "Residential Extended Area", and the
"Chinatown Expansion Tract" (which is more commonly referred
to as the Leather District). The location of each of these
sub-areas is indicated in Exhibits 2,3, and 4.
The Business and Commercial Core consists of primarily the
7 blocks tourists are most familiar with. Bordered on the north
by Essex Street, on the west by Harrison Street, on the east by
the Southeast Expressway and on the south by Kneeland Street
the Business and Commercial Core is more commonly referred to
as "Chinatown". Lying to the south of' the Business and Com-
EXHIBIT 1 Page 14
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EXHIBIT 4
Chinatown Expansion Tract
(Leather District)
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mercial Core is the Residential Extended Area which consists
of the part of the South Cove south of Kneeland Street, Cas-
tle Square, and parts of the South End. The last major sub-
area comprising Chinatown Proper is situated between the Busi-
ness and Commercial Core and the South Station.. Better known
as the Leather District the Chinatown Expansion Tract is the
area where expansion of the Chinatown area is most likely to
occur.
The total population contained in Chinatown Proper is
approximately between 6,000 to 8,000. Contained within
Chinatown Proper is the area that the Action for Boston
Community Development (ABCD) recognizes as having the highest
incidence of poverty among all ABCD designated poverty areas. 2
Chinatown Proper also has the highest concentration of Chinese
and is regarded as the focal and reference point for many thou-
sands of other Chinese in the Greater Boston Area. A distri-
bution of Chinese residents geographically is given in Exhibit
5. Due to the fact that Chinatown Proper has already reached
a saturation point in population practically all increases in
the number of Chinese in the Greater Boston Area occur outside
of Chinatown Proper.
Page 19
EXHIBIT 5
Chinese Population in Chinatown,
Other Parts of Boston and Surrounding
Cities Approximately Within Route
495 (1940-1970)*
1940 1950 1960 1970
Chinatown
Other Parts
Boston
Arlington
Belmont
Bedford
Beverly
Bellingham
Billerica
Braintree
Brookline
Burlington
Brockton
Cambridge
Chelsea
Concord
Canton
Dedham
Everett
Foxborough
Franklin
Framinghiam
Holbrook
Hingham
Holliston
Hudson
Lexington
Lowell
Lynn
Malden
Medford
Marborough
Melrose
Milton
Marshfield
Milford
Marblehead
1300 1600 1800 1258
of
I
300 400 3600 5500
16 10 72 222
31 164
82
14 16 - 40 62
18
39
23 37
38 40 292 9 2
96
37 65 54 143
33 266 554 1274
46 42 32 133
52
'19
5 22
5 16 25
33 186
28
17
28
14
48 189
41 37 172
63 62 116 207
13 19 62 132
13 15 28 150
2 1 41
12 38 98
18
20
1 5 31
5 14
; For a more detailed analysis on Chinese
population change, see ABCD Report-1970.
Metheun
Natick
Needham
Newton
Norwood
Nahant
Pembroke
Peabody
Quincy
Revere
Reading
Randolph
Rockland
Salem
Saugus
Swampscott
Scituate
Sharon
St ought on
Stoneham
Sudbury
Somerville
Te-wksbury
Waltham
Wellesley
Wakefield
Watertown
Wayland
Weston
Wilmington
Winchester
Woburn
Walpole
Westwood
Weymouth
Whitman
Winthrop
TOTAL
4 32
29 69
48 86
17 36 133 414
16 43
14
17
10 8 22 66
27 29 61 191
6 15 26
18 36
13 45
22
28 50 37 82
18 -37
22
18
11
28
15 49
27
21 30 51 351
31
10 39 67 150
37 98
3 25
18 134
63
54
11
17 62
4 46
15
27
11 68
20
8 19
2086 2788 7337 13994
Reprinted from Chinatown Plannin Project,1971
(A pre-conference or the Chinese-American
Civic Association, Boston).
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CHAPTER TI: SELECTED DEMOGRAPHTC CHARACTERTSTTCS
Using the 1970 U.S. Census of Population a number of
demographic characteristics describing the Boston Chinese
norulation can be generated. By comraring these characteris-
tics with those of the general population of Boston diffe-
rences as well as similarities between the two can be iden-
tified. Comparisons of this type was undertaken for the
following characteristics:
Place of Birth.
Age.
Education.
51.6% of the Chinese population in
Boston are foreign born compared to
13.3% of the entire Boston population
as a whole. The percentage figure is
even higher for Chinatown Proper. Only
32.1% o the Uninese population are
actually natives of the Commonwealth
compared to 64.5% of the general popu-
lation. Thus the BCC is still largely
an "immigrant" community.
The age distribution varies little bet-
ween the Chinese and general population
with the possible exception of the "over
65" age-cohort. The Chinese population
does however appear to be "younger",
possibly reflecting larger family size.
The distribution for both populations is
is given in Exhibit 6.
Boston Chinese appear to have lower
educational attainments than does the
general Boston population (population=
25 years and older). The medium school
years completed by adult Boston Chinese
was 8.8 years compared to 1241 years
for the population as a whole. See
Exhibit 7 for the distribution of school
years completed for each group.
EXCHIS' 6
AGE BREAKDOWN FOR BOSTON CHINESE AND GENERAL POPULATION
% of Population (1970)
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
14 19 24 29 34- 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 Over
Age
*Source: 1970 U.S. Census of Population
12%
11%
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
Now.
EXHIflIT '7 Pe2
YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED
BY CHINESE VRS. GENERAL POPULATION *
Chinese
General Population
% of Population
35% 1
30%
25%
20%-
15% -
10% -1
5%
14
7
0 1-4
years years
20
5-7
years
110
8
years
20
.1-
34.
1-3 ' 4 1-3' 41-3 1 4
years years
Highqifh6'I.
1
11
00
X01
0
e-1000"
I ZI
1 3 4
years years
College
School Years Com1leted
* Source: 1970 U.S. Census of Population
7
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Income.
Employment.
Poverty appears to be more pronounced
among Boston Chinese than among the
the general population. 21.9% of
theChinese population have below
poverty incomes as compared to 16.2%
of the general population (a more
detailed examination of the income
status of Chinese appears in Part II).
Contrary to popular belief Chinese are
not "well represented in the professions
and trades". The majority of Chinese
in the labor force are employed in
secondary, service-type jobs; primarily
as restaurant workers or stitchers in
garment factories (for a more detailed
analysis see Occupations in Part II).
In terms of labor force particination
there does appear to be some interesting
variations between the two groups. For
examurnle labor force participation among
Chinese females is noticeably higher than
among the general female population.
Differences in labor force participation
between the Chinese and general population
also appear according to age group (see
Exhibit 8).
Figures on unemployment among Chinese are
not available. No comparisons are therefore
possible.
% in
1 abor
100
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EXHIBIT 8
% of Chinese in Labor Force Vrs. General Population
force Males
15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 /!5-64 65 and over
Aqe Group
in
labor force
Females
1
20
Chinese
General
Population
rr and over
Aqe Group
16-19 20-24 25-34 3F-44
56.
M I-ibraries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http://Iibraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIM ER
Page has been ommitted due to a pagination error
by the author.
Page 27
CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF BOSTON CHINESE COMMUNITY
The first Chinese to appear in the Boston area were pro-
bably sailors and traders who came as a result of the opening
of trade between China and the United States in the 1780's.3
It was not, however, until a hundred years later that the
first Chinese settlers began to arrive. In 1875 some 100 Chi-
nese were "imported" from the West Coast to break a shoe fac-
tory strike in North Adams, a small mill town in Western Massa-
chusetts. Once the strike terminated many of these Chinese
laborers became unemployed and began to drift to larger cities
in search of work. Some eventually found their way to Boston.
Unable to participate in jobs which were closed to them many
of these early Chinese settlers opened laundries in Charlestown,
the North End, East Boston, and along Harrison Avenue in Boston.5
The earliest Chinese settlement in Boston arose in the
vicinity of Scollay Square (now Government Center), a low rent
area adjacent to the Central Business District. This area,
however, provided only temporary quarters. In 1883, a large
number of Chinese were recruited from other parts of the Country
to construct a telephone exchange on Pearl Street.7 With the
influx of these additional Chinese workers a "squatters settle-
ment" soon mushroomed alone a narrow street which came to be
known as Ping On Alley. Eventually Chinese, in search of more
permanent housing, began to expand into the part of the South
Cove area known today as "Chinatown".
By 1890 a Chinese community of approximately 200 had been
established along Oxford and Harrison Streets. They were the
Page -28,
last immigrant group to settle in this area. The area con-
tinued to attract Chinese because of the low rents the area
offered and also because it was conveniently near the South
Station Railroad Terminal; a major point of entry for many
subsequent Chinese immigrants who came overland from the West
Coast.
The area itself had undergone rapid change since it was
first developed as a middle income residential area between
1835 and 1850. With the completion of the South Station Rail-
road Terminal in the 1840's the leather industry entered the
area displacing residences and depressing surrounding land
values. The encroachment of the garment industry after 1860
and the construction of an elevated railway in 1899 through
the heart of Chinatown further depressed rents and land values,
not to mention displacing a number of additional residences.9
The few remaining original residences that have survived in
the area are today almost exclusively occupied by Chinese.
The Chinese community has, from its inception, continued
to grow: slowly at first (due to immigration barriers) but
more rapidly in recent years (after the repeal of exclusionary
immigration laws -see Exhibit 9). Although the population
continued to grow throughout the past century the existing
housing stock has been gradually displaced by, first the
renewed encroachment of the garment industry in the 1940's
and 1950'sand later by the New England Medical Center, the
Massachusetts Turnpike, and the Southeast Expressway. The
eroding quantity of housing and the encirclement of the com-
EXHIBIT 9
(Reprinted from ABCD Report)
Chinese Immigration to Itassachusetts Cities and Towns, 1958-1969
Reported Fiscal Year
CItyo r
Destination 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Boston 42 97 51 62 64 95 91 92 312 355 257 211
Cambridge 12 24 4 5 11 9 19 8 25 63 51 41
New Bedford n.r. n.r. 2 2 1 2 5 1 6 4 5 3
Springfield 1 3 - 1 - 2 4 2 2 10 1 5
Worcester n.r. n.r. n.r. 2 1 2 - 1 9 8 7 3
Other Cities
and Towns 51 72 64 44 36 53 71 48 132 257 160 209
Total 106 196 121 116 113 163 190 152 486 697 481 472
n.r. = data not reported.
1Includes immigrants born in China and Taiwan only.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, U. S. Department of Justice, Annual Report, 1958 through
1969, Tables 12A and 12B. .
Ml111UIR 11 - --llll - - - -MIR
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munity by incapatible and competing land users have culminated
in recent years to create a situation in which the continued
survival of the very heart of the BCC is now in serious ques-
tion.
Although the highest concentration of Chinese continues
to be in Chinatown Proper Chinese,by both choice and necessity,
have moved to outlaying areas in increasing numbers. The lack
of adequate housing has in most cases forced Chinese to locate
outside the preferred Chinatown location. The BCC has thus
evolved in a highly dispersed fashion.
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FOOT NOTES
1. CEDC estimate based on interviews with Chinatown Little
City Hall and Chinese-American Civic Association.
2. ABCD's definition of Chinatown Proper differs from the
one presented here. ABOD defines Chinatown Proper as
includiing the Business and Commercial Core and part of
the Residential Extended Area north of the Mass Turnpike.
3. , "The Chinese In Boston 100 Years of Alienation",
Sampan, April 1975. p. d.
4. Ibid.,p. 8'
5. Ibid., p. 8
6. Ibid., p. 8
7. Ibid., p. 8
8. Murphey, Rhoads. "Boston's Chinatown". Economic Geography
Vol. 28, no. 8; July, 1952. p. 246.
9. Ibid., p. 244
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PART II
THE NEED FOR
PLANNED COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF THE BOSTON CHINESE COMIMNITY
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CHAPTER IT: INTRODUCTION
In the pages to follow an attempt will be made to justi-
fy the need for economically developing the Boston Chinese
Community. It is important to make such a justification for
two reasons. First, it is not generally recognized by the
majority of the general public that Chinese communities are
in desparate need of economic assistance. The popular image
of Chinatowns as model minority communities has left many with
the false impression of Chinatowns as thriving healthy communi-
ties in spite of the evidence to the contrary. It is thus es-
sential that such evidence be documented to show that, in fact,
the BCC is very much a "ghetto" in both the generic and verna-
cular sense of the word and as such requires developmental
assistance. Secondly, apart from justifying the need for econo-
mic development of the BCC as "real" it is also necessary to
justify it as "legitimate". The need for economically deve-
loping urban ghettoes, far from being a foregone conclusion,
is the topic of a continuing debate among urban economists and
planners. Opponents to ghetto development opt for an alterna-
tive solution emphasizing geographic dispersal of ghetto resi-
dents. A case will therefore have to be made to "legitimatize"
the claim that economic development of the BCC is the appropri-
ate response to the problems of that community.
Even should economic development of the BCC prove to be
justifiable further arguments will have to be presented to
support the contention that Planned Community Economic Develop-
ment,as opposed to other forms of economic development, is the
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better prescription to the ills of the community.
In order to acquire a sense as to the extent of the "real"
need for Planned Community Economic Development of the BCC an
understanding of the nature and scope of the major socio-eco-
nomic problems confronting the BCC is required. For it is
towards the ultimate alleviation of these problems that any
economic development effort must eventually be directed. What
will hopefully become clear after an examination of these pro-
blems is that they are not unlike those which confront other
urban ghettoes. However, due to language and cultural barriers
differences do exist which often compound widescale private and
public efforts to assist non-English speaking groups.
The problems examined below are by no means exhaustive.
The delineation of all the community's problems is quite be-
yond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless the problems enu-
merated will provide, the author feels, sufficiently strong
evidence in support of the "real" need for economic development
of the BCC.
Once having defined the major problems of the BCC and
having shown them to be necessary conditions justifying a "real"
need for economic development the other side of the issue will
be addressed; namely whether such a need is a 'legitimate" one.
Finally, the question as to whether Planned Community Economic
Development is capable of fulfilling both the "real" and "legi-
timate" needs for economic development, at least in theory,
will be addressed.
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CHAPTER V:, THE "REAL" NEED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
"At a time when Americans are awash in
worry over the plight of racial minori-
ties--
One such minority, the nation's 300,000
Chinese-Americans, is winning wealth and
respect by dint of its own hard work.
In any Chinatown from San Francisco to
New York, you discover youngsters at
grips with their studies. Crime and de-
linquency are found to be rather minor
in scope.
Still being taught in Chinatown is the
old idea that people should depend on
their own efforts--in order ±o reach
American's 'promised land'."
---U.S. News and World Report
(1966)
For three decades Chinese were protrayed as a "model
minority" who not only successfully embraced the American
Dream but managed to "outwhite the whites" in doing so. The
fact that few Chinese were on the relief or welfare rolls was
taken as an indication that Chinese were doing well and were
not confronted with the same social pathologies confronting
other urban minorities. As a result of a number of events in
recent years, however, it has become evident that the apparent
success of immigrant Chinese in America is as much myth as it
is reality. It became evident upon closer examination, for
example, that the reason so few Chinese were on welfare was
not because they were not in need of such aid but because
they were so intimidated by language and cultural barriers
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that few ventured to seek it. Instead they turned to the
Family Associations (mutual aid associations built around the
concept of the extended family) for what relief that was
available there.
In spite of the fact that in recent years evidence have
surfaced (to be presented below) which indicate
that Chinese suffer from many of the same problems confronting
other disadvantaged minorities) the popular image of Chinese as
a group that has "made it" still persists. Combating this
stereotype image is a major problem for Chinese organizations
attempting to acquire outside aid in dealing with the myriad
of other problems facing Chinese communities. For example,
in turning down a request for a special program coordinator
for Asian-Americans within the Social Security Administration
of H.E.W. the following explanation was given:
"...About one-half the total Asiar-American
population are Chinese and Japanese. Both
these groups have a cultural tradition that
emphasizes educational achievement, a fac-
tor which should enable them to qualify for
government employment without the need for
special programs such as those instituted
for other minority groups. Chinese and
Japanese as well as other Asian-Americans
are well represented in the trades and
professions as well as in the business
world. They are a literate and well in-
formed group well able to represent their 2
views in a forceful and intelligent manner."
Only in the last few years, as a result of a rash of
gang style killings in New Yofk and San Francisco Chinatowns,
has the public been made aware that there may indeed be very
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serious problems confronting the Chinese minority. The popu-
lar image of Chinatowns as model minority communities is thus
beginning to be exposed for what it really is, a myth; a hoax
perpetuated and condoned not only by American Society but by
the Chinese themselves.
So the question arises, why? Why is it taking so long
for the problems to become known and why were the Chinese
so reluctant to admit their existence? Moreover, why did the
American Society let itself be misled when the problems were
so evident if one knew only how to look? The answers to these
questions are mixed. A number of hypotheses have been offered
to explain the behavior of each party in the charade.
In explaining why the Chinese were so reluctant to air
their problems before the general public Stanley Sue, in
noting the evidence presented by Jacobs, Landau, and Pell,
offers one hypothesis;
"Chinese businessmen helped to perpetuate the
myth that the inhabitants of Chinatowns were
esperiencing little difficulties. They (Ja-
cobs, et. al.) represented the views of the
business elite, who were interested in main-
taining the status quo. Social reform was
not in the best interests of employers who
could hire workers at minimum wage levels." 3
Although there may be some merit to this hypothesis a more
likely explanation is given by Stanford Lyman:
"Beyond the problems of the ghetto itself loom
the attitudes and actions of the larger society.
Chinatown's myth of social propriety, communal
self-help, familial solidarity, and a low crime
rate was carefully nurtured and designed to coun-
teract the vicious stereotype of coolie laborers,
Page 38
immoral practices, murderous Tong wars, and
inscrutable cunning that characterized the
American White man's perspective. As a per-
vasive mystique coloring most reports of
Chinatown for the past three decades, it has
succeeded to a point in its original purpose:
to substitute a favorable stereotype for an
unfavorable one. It had other latent func-
tions as well, not the least of which was to
protect the community's social and political
structure from excessive scrutiny and destruc-
tion. So long as Chinatown could 'contain
its problems, circumscribe its para-govern-
mental institutions with bourgeois or inno-
cuously exotic descriptions, and control its
members, the community was safe, and the city
adopted a relaxed attitude toward its own
cosmopolitan character." 4
An avoidance of conflict, maintenance of a low profile,
and minimum interaction with respect to the host society;
policies which Chinese adopted in response to the feelings
of intense racial hatred of "Americans" towards them were
thus influential in causirg the Chinese to "keep a tight
lip" about their problems that they stoically tolerated like
a malignant tumor. It made little sense to air the problems
of the community to an unsympathetic audience who would only
view such problems as confirmation of their own biased beliefs
about the infidelity of the Chinese or "yellow peril" as they
were once referred to. Even after attitudes towards Chinese
changed drastically the act of "putting up a good front" con-
tinued as if the necessity for doing so still existed. It
took a newer more aggresive generation who were not so embued
with the old mentality to break the tradition of silence.
As for the American Society its failure to discover that
Chinese were not "another Oriental minority that has survived
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discrimination to win a place in the nation" can be attribu-
table to two major factors. First, it failed to recognize
another myth; the myth of the homogeneity of the Chinese
population. It assumed as Melford Weiss notes: "that all
Chinese speak a common language, honor the same institutions,
worship common deities, and act as a corporate body in pur-
suing common goals".5 The success of certain segments of the
Chinese population was taken as evidence that all Chinese were
destined for upward mobility. White society has failed to
recognize that there exists sharp ethnic and class distinc-
tions that cut between different segments of the Chinese popu-
lation. The failure to recognize these distinctions is some-
what analogous to failing to recognize the distinctions bet-
ween the German Jews, the Irish, and the Italians who might
otherwise be classified as "Europeans". In the case of the
"Chinese" there also many distinct regional ethnic groups,
each with their own dialect and native customs and traditions.
The vast majority of "Chinese" who immigrated to America prior
to World War II were poor peasant farmers from Southern China
who spoke a Cantonese dialect. Lateras better ties between
China and the United States developed,other "Chinese" (typi-
cally those originating from Northern China) were sent to the
U.S. to study. Being primarily Mandarin speaking they were
were most typically drawn from the ruling elite. As a conse-
quence of the 1949 Revolution many of these Mandarin students
6
were left stranded in the United States. Making the best out
of their situation many became acculturated to American society
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and assumed roles in their adopted country as college pro-
fessors, engineers, scientists, etc. It is essentially from
this elite corps of educated Chinese that "Chinese" have ac-
quired a reputation for scholarly excellence. Although "Chi-
nese", few among this educated elite have chosen to settle in
"Chinatowns". For the most part, along with the few well edu-
cated Cantonese, they have chosen to disassociate themselves
from the laundrymen, restaurant workers, and shopkeepers, etc.
who make up the majority of the "Chinese" population. Thus
while it is true that some Chinese have; "made it" in Amer-
ica it is wrong to generalize that all Chinese have made it or are
"making it". Such a presumption fails to recognize the hetero-
geneity of the Chinese population.
The second major factor which has contributed to Ameri-
cans Society's acceptance of the myth of Chinese success can
be labeled as "wishful thinking". It has been suggested that
America wants to believe in the Chinese success story because
it wants to believe in the efficacy and equitableness of the
American System. As Amy Tachiki notes:
"The Asian success story functions to validate
the fundamental soundness of this system and
to support the 'truth' that all deserving peo-
ple of any color can and should earn a middle-
class position and life style within this
society. Despite the disadvantaged status of
millions in the United States, most Americans
cling to the ideal that American democratic
capitalism guarantees self-determination for
all its people. By accepting the distorted
picture of Asian American success, America
rationalizes its racist behavior - and fools
itself that it is responsive to the people."7
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If this hypothesis is correct then it becomes obvious why the
problems of Chinese ghettoes have for so long remained con-
cealed. As long as it was in both the interests of the Chi-
nese and American Society to ignore the problems than to ad-
mit their existence both sides had a stake in maintaining
the myth of the Chinese success story.
And so long as this myth prevails the need for housing,
day care facilities, job training programs, open space;
the need to utilize underdeveloped resources: the need to
raise the standard of living above the poverty level; and
all the other needs that justify the one basic need for eco-
nomic development remain unrecognized and neglected.
Evidence of the "Real" Need for Economic Development:
The range of problems that support the contention that
the need for economically developing the BCC is real spans
a broad spectrum. Partly to simplify the discussion and
partly due to data limitations the major problems of the BCC
have been categorized into distinct problem areas. As a
consequence much of the interacting cause and effect rela-
tionships or "jointness" between and among these distinct
problem areas will not be sufficiently emphasized. A static
rather than dynamic synopsis of the community's problems is
thus presented. Despite these deficiencies, however, the
problems as stated in their static descriptive forms will
provide useful insights as to both the causes and manifes-
tations of the problems confronting the BCC today.
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Before delving into the problems and issues that the BCC
must today contend with it will be useful to first briefly
describe the historical experience of Chinese in America. By
doing so a clearer focus can be brought to bear on how and
why problems facing the community have evolved and continue
to persist over time.
1. Historical Perspective.
The history of the Chinese in the United States is for
the most part a history of intense racial hatred. The un-
wavering anti-chinese sentiments that prevailed up to the mid-
dle of the 2oth century is manifested in a number of legis- .
lated laws enacted against the Chinese. By tracing these
laws through time one can acquire a sense of the different
intensities of anti-Chinese sentiments at different points in
time. Such a procedure is useful in providing a skeletal
framework around which a narrative of Chinese-American his-
tory can be constructed.
The narrative begins with the discovery of gold in Cali-
fornia in 1840. The gold rush fever that ensued was not con-
fined to the American mainland. It quickly spread to other
corners of the world drawing thousands of immigrant gold
seekers to the hills of California. Among those who came
were the Chinese. Beginning in 1850 wave after wave of Chi-
nese immigrants began to arrive: attracted on the one hand,
by the promise of the "gold Mountain" and prodded, on the
other, by severely limited opportunities, famine, and politi-
Page 43
cal suppression in their homeland. Virtually all who came
originated from Kwantung Province and were typically poor pea-
sant farmers and laborers. Almost without exception they were
young and middle aged males. Very few came with the intention
of settling. Most were "sojourners" who came with the inten-
tion of oroviding support for their families who remained in
China. The Chinese therefore did not aome to till the land
nor did they attempt to assimilate into what they regarded as
a barbarian and alien culture. Driven from their homes by
abject poverty and with the responsibilities to their families
heavy on their hearts they were more than willing to work for
subsistance wages offered them. It was perhaps inevitable
that Chinese came to be resented. In openingly admitting no
strong attachment to the host society and by undercutting wages
to a level other groups could not compete with the Chinese be-
came the first victims of, a then growinganti-foreigner move-
ment.
Anti-Chinese sentiments were to reach their most intense
heights in California where most Chinese immigrants were ini-
tially to be found. Beginning in the 1850's and 1860's a num-
ber of infamous tax laws were enacted that were almost exclu-
sively enforced against the Chinese.8 Starting with the Foreign
Miner's Tax (which during its final 16 years of enforcement
taxed Chinese miner's up to 98% of their total take) a number
of equally discriminary laws were enacted against Chinese
fisherment, cigar manufacturers, vendors, and evenually even
9
Chinese Laundrymen. As the anti-Chinese movement gained
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momentum stricter laws were enacted against the Chinese.
Thus,for example, laws were enacted which prevented Chinese
from being employed by corporations or public agencies and
which disallowed Chinese testimony against whites in the
Courts.10
Instead of resisting these oppressive laws the Chinese
moved Eastward into the Rockies and beyond in hope of finding
a more tolerant environment. But everywhere they went simi-
lar anti-Chinese sentiments arose. N. Wagner points to one
newspaper editorial which pretty much summarizes the feelings
during the times towards Chinese:
"The Chinese are the least desired immigrants
who have ever sought the United States...the
almond eyed Mongolian with his pig tail, his
heathenism, his filthy habits, his thrift and
careful accumulation of savings to be sent
back to the flowery kingdom.
The most we can do is to insist that he is he
is a heathen, a devourer of soup made from the
fragrant juice of the rat, filthy, disagreeable,
and undesirable generally, an incumbrance that
we do not know how to get rid of, whose tribe
we shall not increase in this part of the world."
In spite of the intense hatred against them Chinese
continued to arrive in the United States in droves. Many
were contracted to work in building the Trancontinental Rail-
road. Others were hired to reclai.m Californian swamplands or
to work mining valuable minerals and ores in the Rocky Moun-
tains. Chinese immigration continued at a rapid pace until
1882, when alarmed by the huge influx of cheap Chinese labor,
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Californians pressured the United States Congress into enacting
the first of a succession of exclusionary immigration laws
aimed specifically towards stemming the tide of Chinese immi-
gration. Anti-Chinese sentiments thus became translated into
national policy. In the decades that followed increasingly
restrictive limitations were imposed against Chinese immigra-
tion.
The cumulative effects of these restrictive exclusionary
laws proved largely responsible for reducing the Chinese popu-
lation in the United States from a high of 107,488 in 1890 to
a low of 61,639 in 1920.2 The enactment of exclusionary immi-
gration laws also had dire consequences for those immigrants
who chose to remain in the United States. These laws not only
managed to effectively control immigration but also prevented,
for many years, the natural increase in the Chinese-American
population. This was largely accomplished by the passage of
the 1924 Immigration Act which prohibited wives from joining
their husbands in the United States thus exacerbating an al-
ready desparate situation in which males outnumbered females
13
as much as 7 to 1. In a culture which placed a high premium
in continuing the family lineage such a law proved to be ex-
ceptionally cruel.
Anti-Chinese sentiments remained strong until World War
II when in response to Japan's invasion of the China Mainland
American attitudes towards Chinese dramatically changed. These
changes were later reflected in a number of President Direc-
tives and Congressional Acts greatly liberalizing conditions
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governing Chinese immigration. The War Brides Act, the Dis-
placed Person Act of 1948, and a successive number of Refugee
Relief Acts allowed new influxes of Chinese immigrants into
14the United States. The Immigration Act of 1965 was another
major milestone in changing attitudes towards Chinese immi-
grants. Prior to the passage' of the Act, but subsequent to
1943, immigration laws, although less stringent than what
was previously the case, emphasized a preferred selection
policy stressing admission to those with skills or high levels
of education. These conditions for admittance were later res-
15,
cinded by the Johnson Administration in 1965, Con-
sequently, anyone who is able to acquire sponsorship of an
immediate blood relative may now apply for admission. Besides
helping to reunite families the Act also had special provisions
providing long-time illegal residents the opportunity of le-
galizing their status and of applying for citizenship.
Since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 the Chi-
nese-American population has increased dramatically, more than
doubling since 1960. Immigration has continued at a rate of
16
20,000 per year. Today there are approximately 600,000 Chinese
in the United States. The influx of new immigrants has had a
tremendous impact on Chinese communities. Due to large num-
ber of Chinese immigrants, Chinese communities have swelled
to the bursting point (see Exhibit 9A). As a result of the
rapid rate of growth in population in Chinese communities a
number of serious problems have arisen. Some of these pro-
blems are enumerated below.
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EXHIBIT 9A
Chinese Immigration to the United States, 1850-19741
Year or Decade Number Annual Average
1851-60 41,397 4,140
1861-70 64,301 6,430
1871-80 123,201 12,320
1881-90 61,711 6,171
1891-00 14,799 1,479
1901-10 20,605 2,061
1911-20 21,278 2,921
1921-30 29,207 2,921
1931-40 4,928 493
1941-50 16,709 1,671
1951-60 35,858 3,586
1961-70 122,281 12,244
1971-74 82,694 26,924
1For the years 1850-1950, data are tabulated by country of last
residence; from 1951 to 1974, by country of birth. For the lat-
ter two decaded, those born in Taiwan and Hong Kong are included
with those born in China.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department
of Justice, Annual Report.
The current population of the Chinese in the United States is
590,000.
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2. Language.
Language presents, by far, the most prevalent and per-
vasive of all problems confronting Chinese. The extreme
difficulties Chinese immigrants have in adjusting to life in
American can be traced directly to their inability to speak
and understand basic English. Preliminary results from an
informal survey conducted by the Boston Chinese Community
Health Center and Tufts University (1974) show that approxi-
mately 50% of those surveyed speak, understand, read, and
18
write little if any English, The same
survey found language problems more pronounced among middle
aged, upper aged, and female subgroups (see Exhibits 10 & 11).
The results of another informal survey conducted by the
Saturday Morning Program indicate that language barriers have
significant impact on Chinese's ability to participate in
American society. Of those participants in the Program
surveyed 76% believed that acquiring fluency in English would
result in better employment. 94% believed language to be
the major problem confronting them above those of housing,
employment, discrimination, crime, medical care, and children's
education. 19Although certainly not an unbiased sample the sur-
vey nevertheless points out the high premium many Chinese
place on acquiring English language skills.
Lack of fluency in English has severely limited the mo-
bility of,and opportunities open to, Chinese. In addition it
leaves many in the position of not being able to exercise
EXHIBIT '10
Extent of English Language Problems
Among Boston Chinatown Residents by Age
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Percent Chinatown Residents
Problem Area
Age: 18-32 33-52 53 up
Understand English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A little
Not at all
35.1%
16.9%
39.0%
9.1%
7.0%
15.5%
53.5%
23.9%
8.0%
11.5%
39.1%
41.4%
Total
Speak English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A little
Not at all
Total
Read English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A little
Not at all
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
35.1% 7.0% 8.0%
16.9% 15.5% 11.5%
39.0% 52.1% 37.9%
9.1% 25.4% 42.5%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
36.0% 8.5% 5.8%
16.0% 12.7% 7.0%
37.7% 47.3% 37.6%
13.3% 36.6% 54.7%
Total
Write English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A little
Not at all
100.0%
100.0%
34.7%
14.7%
38.7%
12.0%
100.0%
7.0%
11.3%
46.5%
35.2%
100.0%
5.8%
5.8%
29.1%
59.3%
100.0%Total 100.0%
EXHIBIT 11
Extent of English Language Problems
Among Boston Chinatown Residents by Sex (18 yrs. & over)
Percent Chinatown Residents
Problem Area
Males Females Total
Understand English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A Little
Not At All
21.1%
19.3%
45.0%
14.7%
12.7%
10.3%
42.1%
34.9%
16.6%
14.5%
43.4%
25.5%
Total
Speak English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A Little
Not At All
Total
Read English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A Little
Not At All
Total
Write English
Fluently
Fairly Fluently
A Little
Not At All
Total
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
21.1% 12.7% 16.6%
19.3% 10.3% 14.5%
46.8% 38.9% 42.6%
12.8% 38.1% 26.4%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
21.1% 12.2% 16.4%
11.9% 11.4% 11.6%
42.2% 30.9% 36.2%
24.8% 48.5% 35.8%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
19.3% 12.2% 15.5%
10.1% 10.6% 10.3%
45.0% 30.9% 37.5%
25.7% 45.5% 36.6%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: From a study conducted in 1974-1975 by the Boston Chinese
Community Health Services, Inc., and Tufts University's
Department of Sociology.
Note: Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors.
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their basic rights. As will be pointed out in later sections
language barriers have resulted in:
a) Preventing Chinese from acquiring U.S. citizenship,
b) Severely limiting the spectrum of jobs and oppor-
tuties open to Chinese.
c) Confining residential location choices of Chinese.
d) Increasing Chinese dependency on the local Chinese
community.
e) Restricting Chinese access to private and public
institutions and services,
f) Directly and indirectly weakening the family as a
social unit by causing a generation and communica-
tion gap between parents and their children,
g) Increasing mental duress among Chinese who are unable
to speak even "survival English" thereby causing them to
suffer from frustration and insecurity.
h) The inablility of Chinese to communicate the pro-
blems associated with all the above to those in
the position most able to help.
Further aggravating the problem is the fact that "Chinese"
itself is not a homogeneous language but consists of many
regional dialects. In Boston three major dialects are spoken:
Toisanese, Cantonese, and Mandarin. Thus not only do Chinese
have difficulties in communicating with non-Chinese but often
in communicating among themselves.
Language barriers are extremely difficult to overcome.
Phonetically and syntactically English and Chinese are very
dissimilar. Certain phrases and words have no comparable
translation (for example, in Chinese there are approximately
fifty characters for the English equivalent of "rice").
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When the problems of speaking English are compounded by pro-
blems of reading and writing it becomes virtually impossible
for working Chinese who must spend 60 to 70 hours working
per week to learn any modicum of English.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that language pro-
blems (although the most severe) is only part of the cultural
barriers isolating Chinese from the rest of society. Under-
standing the American system,in all its many facets, is diffi-
cult for new immigrants. Historically Chinese have been taken
advantage of by their ignorance and as a result many Chinese
have become very suspicious of "outsiders" and have attempted
to minimize interaction with them by withdrawing into their
own closed societies.
3. Income.
The distribution of income among Boston Chinese families
for 1970 is given in Exhibit 12. The mean income is reported
by the 1970 U.S. Census of Population to be $7,812 or $1,321
below the mean family income for the City as a whole. 18.5%
of Chinese families reported incomes below the poverty line
(with a mean income deficit of $1,672), compared to 11.3% of
all city-wide families. Poverty among Chinese households
consisting of unrelated individuals was even more pronounced
(21.9% and 36.6% respectively, had below poverty incomes).
The widespread extent of poverty among the elderly (65 years
of age and older) was also quite evident. 37.1% of the
elderly living in households with unrelated individuals indi-
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EXHIBIT- 12
1970 Boston-Chinese Family Incomes (1969 constant dollars)
Income Level Percent of Chinese Families
less than .$1,000 4.6%
$1,000 to $1,999 2.2%
$2,000 to $2,999 4.4%
$3,000 to $3,999 10.6%
$4,000 to $4,999 11.5%
$5,000 to $5,999 6.7%
$6,000 to $6,999 9.0%
$7,000 to $7,999 11.8%
$8,000 to $8,999 7.0%
$9,000 to $9,999 6.1%
$10,000 to $11,999 10.0%
$12,000 to $14,999 6.6%
$15,000 to $24,999 8.6%
$23,000 and over .6%
Total 100%
Mean $7,812
Source: 1970 U.S. Census of Population
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cated below poverty incomes. Only 11.1%/ of the elderly living
alone, however, reported incomes below the poverty level. To-
gether these statistics indicate that poverty exists in the
Chinese community to a substantial degree. Closer examina-
tion of the Census data however, reveals that the intensity
of poverty among Boston Chinese may be somewhat overstated.
There is good reason to suspect that the 1970 Census
figures for income do not reflect accurately the true welfare
of Boston Chinese. This is not to say that poverty does not
exist but only that the mean income deficit is not as large
as the Census figures indicate. Experience suggests that
many in the lowest income brackets receive, as part of their
wages, non-monetary contributions-in-kind. This is especially
true of restaurant workers, who form the bulk of low wage
earners. Typically,as part of their wages, they receive free
meals in leiu of money wages. If the imputed value of these
meals were to be included in "income" the mean income deficit
of those with incomes below the poverty line would be some-
what lower than now reported. It should also be noted, how-
ever, that restaurant workers typically work 60 to 70 hours
per week. Thus while they may have higher than reported in-
comes they must work consideralby longer than normal hours
to obtain it.
While low incomes are prevalent among Chinese the inci-
dence of poverty falls greatest for households in and imme-
diately surrounding the Chinatown area (if only because this
area has a disportionate share of single males and elderly
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which, as noted earlier, are groups with a high incidence of
poverty). Also families residing in Chinatown are more prone
to have lower incomes than Chinese residing outside the area.
The ABCD 1970 Report on Chinese in Boston indicates that the
medium family income levels in Chinatown is lowest of all ABOD
anti'poverty designated poverty areas (see Exhibit 13).
4. Housing.
For much of the last 50 years the housing stock of China-
town has been systematically removed. In 1950 the housing
20
stock was one-half what it was in 1925. The garment indus-
try accounted for much of this decline as it moved into the
Chinatown area in the 1940's and 1950's. Since then three
other major developments occured which have seriously reduced
available housing at a point in time when the Chinese popula-
tion was just beginning to experience a surge in growth. The
New England Medical Center purchased much of the land in
Chinatown and through a process of expansion eradicated many
much needed residential units. Later the construction of two
major transportation arteries along with urban renewal again
substantially reduced the housing stock. The accumulated
actions of these three major agents of change have effectively
reduced the land area of Chinatown by half from what it was in
1950. 21
The housing that remain today are in severely deteriorating
condition. Most were built during the period spanning 1835
to 1850 and were originally inhabited by middle income native
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Exhibit 13
(Reprinted from ABCD Report)
Chinatown and Anti-Poverty
Median Family Income, 1969
Target Areas Ranked by
Area Median Rank
Income
Non-target areas $9,719 1
Roxbury-N. Dorchester $7,250 2
Dorchester $7,125 3
Jamaica Plan and
Parker Hill-Fenway $6,999 4-5
South End $6,750 6
Allston-Brighton $5,999 7
Charlestown & South Boston $5,917 8-9
East Boston & North End $5,700 10-11
CHINATOWN $5,170 12
City of Boston $7,543
Source: 1969 Boston Area Survey, and Diagnostic Report of Residents to be
Relocated, South Cove Urban Renewal Project, 1967. BRA figures are
expressed in 1969 dollars.
TABLE
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Americans. They were followed by a succession of immigrant
ethnic groups. First came the Irish, then the Jews and
Italians, and finally the Chinese. The present housing stock
has thus undergone continued intensive use.
"Hard" data on the housing conditions in Chinatown is
not available. Even the 1970 Housing Census Block Statistics
fail to depict the condition of housing in the area. The
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), however, unofficially
reports that before 1970 seventy-two persent of the housing
units in Chinatown were considered delapidated or deteriora-
ting compared to 14% of the dwelling units for the City as a
whole (See Exbihit 14). The BRA further reports' that 78% of
the dwelling units in Chinatown are overcrowded compared to
7.7% for the City as a whole. Also unofficially reported
was dwelling densities. The average apartment contained 2.6
rooms with 4.4,persons per dwelling compared to 2.8 persons
per dwelling for the City as a whole. The 1970 U.S. Census
of Population supports the view that Chinese typically live
in overcrowded housing. As is roughly indicated in Exhibit 15
Chinese households are typically larger in size but tend to
live in smaller size units than is true for all Boston house-
holds as a group.
Much of the housing in the core area of Chinatown are in
multiuse buildings with commercial facilities on the ground
floors and dwelling units above. Such mixed uses have facili-
tated cheaper than otherwise possible rents. Thus, although
the dwelling units are in general disrepair they do offer
EXHIBIT 14
(Reprinted from ABCD Report)
Housing Conditions in Chinatown and Boston
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Conditions Chinatown City of Boston
Dwelling Units
Sound 28% 86%
Deteriorating 58
14
Dilapidated 14
TOTAL 100% 100%
Overcrowded2 78% 7
Structures
Sound 9% n.a.
Deteriorating 79 n.a.
Dilapidated 12 n.a.
TOTAL 100%
n.a. = data not available.
IThe U.S. Department of Commerce.defines sound housing as that
which has defects that can be corrected during regular maintenance.
Deteriorated housing has defects of an intermediate nature that must
be corrected if a building is to provide safe and adequate shelter,
and dilapidated housing is defined as inadequate and unsafe, requir-
ing extensive repair or rebuilding.
2 lore than one person Der room.
Sources: Unofficial BRA estimate, 1970, and Boston Area Survey.
renewal, and expansion by the Medical Center in the 1960's reduced
the land area of Chinatown by half. The decrease in available housing
coincided with a sharp increase in population, with severe overcrowding
as the result. With Chinatown's population increasing at a rate of
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EXHIBIT 15
1970 Comparison of Selected Housing Characteristics Between
Boston-Chinese and 11 Boston Households
Characteristic Percent of Chinese Percent of All Boston
Households Households
Age of Unit
Occupied
6 years old 0.0% 1.0%
7 to 10 years old 13.0% 5.0%
11 to 15 years old 3.0% 3.0%
16 to 25 years old 3.0% 6.0%
26 to 35 years old 5.0% 8.0%
36 years old & older 77j0% 77.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
No. of Rooms in
Unit Occupied
1 room 11.0% 6.0%
2 rooms 16.0% 7.0%
3 rooms 20.0% 15.0%
4 rooms 18.0% 20.0%
5 rooms 20.0% 24.0%
6 rooms 10.0% 16.0%
7 rooms 5.0% 12.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0%
(continued...)
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Persons/household
1 person
2 persons
3 persons
4 persons
5 persons
6 persons or more
Total
Percent of Chinese
Households
22.0%
17.0%
16.0%
14.0%
11.0%
20.0%
100.0%
Percent of All Boston
Households
29.0%
29.0%
15.0%
11.0%
7.0%
1000%
100.0%
Median, all occupied
units
Median owner occupies
units
Median rental occupied
units
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
4,8%
4.8%
2.8%
3.1%
2.0%
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relatively inexpensive housing. Rents however do not allow
for adequate building maintenance and repair. Chinese Economic
Development Council (CEDC) estimates that residential units
owned by the Chinese Merchants Association, a major landlord
in the area, loose between $40,000 to $60,000 annually on their
residential property. Only a desire to maintain a residential
quality in the neighborhood have kept these buildings from
being removed.
Improvement in the housing stock within the last five
years have come about largely as a result of public housing
developments. Tai Tung Village, Castle Square, and the Mass
Pike developments have created dwelling units for over 1000
Chinese residents. Quincy Towers,now under construction will
add an additional 162 units of elderly housing of which 60%
will be occupied by Chinese. Rehabilitation of moderate in-
come units have only been recently completed on Oxford Street.
Yet with these additions and improvements in the housing stock
there is still a large unfulfilled demand for low cost housing.
Long waiting lists exists for all the developments mentioned
above. Vacancy rates in Chinatown are at an absolute minimum.
The estimated arrival of 300 additional immigrants per year
to Boston have exerted continued pressures for housing in
Chinatown.24 A limited demand for moderate, middle, and upper
income housing is also presently not being met.
Many, unable to find housing within Chinatown have been
forced elsewhere. Chinese are continuing to spill over into
the South End and Brookline. A checker board pattern of re-
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sidential devlopment has thus occured. The housing charac-
teristics of these residential pockets outside of the China-
town area have not been studied to date and needs to be inves-
tigated.
5. Employment.
Because the Chinese were systematically dislodged and
excluded from many area of employment during the late 1800's
by a succession of anti-Chinese legislation they have since
traditionally attempted to avoid direct economic competition
with other groups. Consequently Chinese have been cast into
predominantly service orientated occupations which others
either abdicated or could not do. The predominance in the
past of Chinese laundries and restaurants as the major sources
of Chinese employment well reflects this fact.
Due to the still somewhat restrictive nature of immigra-
tion laws prior to 1965 the relatively small numbers of immi-
grants who managed to gain entry into the United States were
easily absorbed by existing Chinese dominated industries.
For as long as the total national population and its penchant
for Chinese cuisine and goods continued to grow there was a
corresponding growth in employment opportunities. These
"demand derived" increases in available jobs and jobs created
by upward mobile Chinese proved to be more or less adequate
in providing jobs for new immigrant arrivals. Chinese females
were, in addition, able to find jobs in the then rapidly
growing garment industry. Subsequent to 1965, however, the
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steady and growing influx of new immigrants has outpaced the
absorbtive capacity of existing sources of employment (which
in many cases were in decline as was true for the laundry in-
dustry which was becoming increasingly more automated). Thus
unemployment figures for Chinese while still relatively low
appears to be on the increase. At the time of the 1970 Census,
count unemployment was very low among Boston Chinese; being
3% for males and 3.6% for females. With the downturn of the
Economy subsequent to 1970 employment rates are believed to
have declined. The increase in unemployment can be attributed
to a number of factors: the current recession, the marked de-
cline of the garment industry, the growing unemployment rate
among Chinese teenagers, the increasing number of new immi-
grants,and the rapidly maturing restaurant industry which has
expanded already to a near saturation point.
Current unemployment rates among Boston Chinese are not
available. From cursory observation however it is not as pre-
valent as it could be. With the deportation of over 100 ille-
gal Chinese immigrants in the past year many jobs (especially
25in restaurants) have been vacated.
Even more distrubing than the prospects for increased
unemployment is the more chronic problem of underemployment.
This comes as no real surprise considering the limited access
Chinese have to the job market due to language barriers. The
1970 U.S. Census of Population provides some indication of the
extent of underemployment among Chinese.
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The distribution of Chinese in Boston among different
occupations for 1970 was heavily skewed towards the "service
workers except private households" category for males and
"operatives including transport" category for females (see
Exhibit 16). Nearly 58% of emplyed Chinese males are employed
as service workers compared to 16% for all males in the City
as a whole. Of all employed females 52% were employed as
operatives, compared to 29.5% of all employed females in the
City. Both figures are highly reflective of the predominance
of Chinese in the restaurant and garment industries. These
percentage figures are even higher in the immediate Chinatown
area since most Chinese white collar professionals and mana-
gers live in the outlaying areas reflecting their higher sta-
tus. Although somewhat outdated the 1970 ABCD report never-
theless points out a striking observation in which 82% of
employed heads of Chinese households in Chinatown work in
service related activities and primarily in restaurants. 26In
comparison only 11% of male heads of heaseholds in other anti-
poverty target areas are employed in service related activi-
ties. A more detailed breakdown is presented in Exhibit 16A.
Although heavily overrepresnted in service occupations
Chinese are relatively underrepresented in White-collar
occupations (see Exhibit 17). The 1970 Census of Population
indicates that 34% of Chinese tare employed in white-collar
as compared to 55% of the city-wide workforce. There is no
difference, however, in the proportion of Chinese employed in
blue-collar occupations in comparison with the general work-
EXHIBIT 16
1970 Occupational Profile Comparison Between
Chinese in Boston and All Bostonians As A Whole By Sex
Percent of Employed Chinese Percent of Employed
Occupation Group (16 yrs. & older) Bostonians (16 yrs.
In Occupation Group & older) in Occupa-
tion Group
Males Females Total
1. Professional, Techni-
cal and Kindred Work-
ers 13.9% 6.9% 11.3% 16.8%
2. Managers and Admini-
strators except Farm 9.1% 0.6% 5.6% 5.6%
3. Sales Workers 0.2% 3.3% 2.2% 5.7%
4. Clerical and Kindred
Workers 5.9% 27.4% 14.2% 26.9%
5. Craftsmen, Foreman,
and Kindred workers 2.4% 0.0% 1.5% 9.1%
6. Operatives, including
Transport 7.2% 51.7% 24.2% 13.8%
7. Laborers, except Farm 2.0% 0.0% 1.2% 4.1%
8. Farmers and Farm
Managers 0.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.1%
9. Farm Laborers and
Foreman 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
10. Service Workers, except
Private Household 58.0% 8.3% 38.7% 16.0%
11. Private Household
Workers 0.0% 1.1% 0.4% 0.8%
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
I Note: Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors.
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EXHIBIT 16A
(Reprinted fran ABCD 1eport)
Occupational Profiles of Employed Household Heads Among South Cove Chinese and in Anti-Povert
Target Areas, 196 and 1%9.
Category Parker Rox-
of CHINA- Allston- Chas- Col. Dor- East Jamaica No. Hill- N.Dor- South South All City of
Employment TOWN Brighton town Point chester Boston Plain End Fenway chester Boston End TAs Boston
White-
Collar 12% 52% 19% n.a. 30% 48% 54% 48% 54% 20% 19% 23% 37% 46%
Blue-
Collar2  6 30 69 n.a. 59 45 29 45 29 51 69 43 45 39
Service 82 18 12 n.a. 11 7 17 7 17 29 12 34 18 15
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% n.a. 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n.a.: data not available.
Includes Proprietors and the Professional, Managerial, Clerical, and Sales categories.
2 1ncludes Craftsmen, Foremen, Skilled and Unskilled Laborers.
Sources: Chinatown data from BRA Diagnostic Report; target neighborhoods from ABCD CAP 5.
ON
Q9)
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EXHIBIT 17
1970 Boston-Chinese Employment
Pattern by Occupational Type
Occupational Type
White Collar1
Blue Collar 2
Service3
Chinese Employed (16 yrs. & older)
34.3%
27.3%
39.1%
(55.0%)4
(27.2%)
(16.8%)
Total 100.0% (100.0%)
lIncludes Occupation Group Categories 1, 2, 3, 4.
2Includes Occupation Group Categories 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
3Includes Occupation Group Categories 10, 11.
4Bostonians' employment pattern by occupation type.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
Note: Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors.
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force (27% and 27%, respectively).
From the available data it aopears that Chinese workers
are primarily employed in low paying secondary jobs. It would,
however, be erroneous to conclude that this is due to skill
deficiences. There is evidence to suggest that other factors
instead are at play. Deficiencies in language, rejection of
foreign credentials, overspecification of job requirements,
lack of U.S. citizenship and discrimination provide better
explanations as to -hy Chinese occupy jobs low on the job-
totem pole. To what extent these factors restrict Chinese
employment is not yet known but it appears from statistics
provided by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
that many Chinese immigrants possess high skill lev'els that
are not reflected in their present occupations. Considering
it is not uncommon to find professionals and technicians
working as waiters in Chinese restaurants this hypothesis
seems quite plausible. As indicated in Exhibit 18 over 30%
of those immigrants indicating occupations have been previously
employed as professionals or technicians. Assuming that most
Chinese white-collar workers presently employed as such are
primarily second, third, and fourth generation Chinese the
obvious conclusion one can draw is that a vast pool of talent
among Chinese immigrants are not being fully utilized. This
represents a tremendous waste of manpower and loss of pro-
duction opportunities.
EXHIBIT 18
Previous Occupational Categories. of
Chirfese Admitted to the United States, 19741
Page- 6-9
Distribution2
All
Occupational All Reporting
Categories Number Admitted Occupations
Professional, technical
and kindred
Manager & Administrators,
except farms
Sales Workers
Clerical & Kindred
Workers
Craftsmen & Kindred
Workers
Operation, except
Transportation
Transport Equipment
Operators
Laborers, except
Farms
Farmers and Farm
Managers
Farm Laborers &
Farm Foremen
Service Workers, except
Private households
Private Household
Workers
Subtotal
Housewives, children and
others for which occu-
pation was not reported
2,796
1, 273
243
1,005
465
629
114
319
17
307
1,571
242
8,981
14,704
Total 23, 685
11.8%
5.3%
1.0%
4.2%
2.0%
2.7%
0.5%
1.4%
0.1%
1.3%
6.7%
1.0%
38%
31.1%
14.1%
2.7%
11.2%
5.2%
7.0%
1.3%
3.6%
0.2%
3.4%
17.5%
2.7%
100%
62%
100%
1 Immigrants born in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
2 Rounded Percentages.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of
Justice, Annual Report, 1974, Table 8A.
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6. Juvenile Delinquency.
Juvenile delinquency among Boston Chinese youth has not,
in the past, been a major problem in Boston's Chinese Community
as it has been in larger Chinatowns. The smallness of the
community, the ability of the community to monitor the activi-
ties of its youth, and social and civic programs geered to pro-
vide outlets for unspent energies of youth have managed to
contain juvenile delinquency to a minimum. There are, however,
indications that juvenile delinquency may be on the rise. Sam-
pan reports that in 1973 the number of juvenile delinquency
incidents reported increased from one incident in 1972 to
27
twenty-two. Whether juvenile delinquency will reach the magni-
tude of "gang killings" that have occured in New York and San
Francisco's Chinatowns is doubtful, at least for the near
future (one such killing did however occur in Boston China-
town in 1974). Yet the trend is similar to that which pre-
ceeded the rise of juvenile delinquency in these other Chi-
nese communities. Such a trend is characterised by the
following traits:
a) A marked increase in the number of youths under the
age of 19. There were 26% more Chinese youths in
1970 in the city of Boston tan there were in 1960
for the entire Boston SMSA. 0 One-half of all Chinese
in Boston public schools in 1970 were foreign-born;
the group most prone to have troubles in adjusting.
b) A deterioration of the family as a social unit.
Contrary to popular believe Chinese have not been
sucessful to a large extent in preserving the family
as a strong social unit. It is not uncommon, for
example, to find parents who cannot even verbally
communicate with their children due to language
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barriers. Surprising as it may seem many Chinese
children are unable to communicate in Chinese to
their non-English speaking parents. It is less
surprising when one considers that many parent
both work long and late hours and consequently
have little time to spend with their children
(who are often left alone unattended and unsuper-
vised). The problem is further exacerbated by
tensions created by cross-cultural conflicts that
occur as old Chinese clash with new American tra-
ditions and customs. Thus on top of a generation
gap are communication and cultural gaps which many
parents and offspring find impossible to bridge.
c) Lack of adequate recreational facilities.
This is an especially acute problem in Boston's
Chinatown whichas a result of being located in
the Central Business District, lacks any modicum
of open space. Presently there are three small
playground areas of which the Quincy Schoolyard
and Pagado Park playground are used with any
great frequency. In passing it is interesting
to note that recreational facilities and programs
for young adults are even more lacking. The
author is aware of one poignant case of one young
adult restaurant worker whose only source of re-
creation was to ride the subway on his days off.
Planned activities for youth while presently pro-
vided by the Y.M.C.A., churches, and various other
organizations are really not sufficient to meet
the needs.
d) An inablility among foreign-born teens to adust to
American life. Adusting to American life can be
a traumatic experience, especially for teens immi-
grating from Hong Kong. Thrown into schools withnut
adequate language training and among students of
completely different cultures many become quickly
alienated as they fall behind in their studies they
do not understand and become self-consciously aware
of the vast differences that separate them from
their peers. Without adequate compensation of love
and affection in their home life many begin to lose
self-esteem and self-confidence and eventually drop
out of school (which is becoming more and more common).
In 1970 28% of Chinese males between the ages of
16 and 21 were not enrolled in schools. 36% of the-
non-enrollees -failed to graduate from high school. '9
e) Lessening job opportunities. With jobs in the general
Economy becoming more scarce the ones to suffer the
most tend to be teenagers. Without adequate education
or training, compounded by language and cultural
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barriers, employment for Chinese youths 1T1 1 be
increasingly more difficult to come by.
f) A growing dissatisfaction with the conservative,
elder dominated community leadership. The believe
Yiat "age is wisdom" and "children should be seen
but not heard" characterizes the thinking of many
community elders who are the ruling force in vir-
tually all affairs affecting the community. With-
out a voice in the community youths have a diffi-
cult time in making known their needs and problems.
Efforts by youths to initiate social change "have
been met with 'suspicion and contempt' by elder
who wish to maintain a facade of tranquility."
With the demands of youths falling on deaf ears
resentment and frustration becomes the lot of
many youth.
If the pattern of juvenile delinquency follows that of
other Chinatowns a definite increase is likely to occur in
Boston. To date the BUG has been successful in keeping out
gangs from New York's Chinatown and preventing them from
spreading their influence into Boston. How long it can con-
tinue to do so is open to question. Less open to question is
the need to heed the present warning signals and the pleas for
help: the same pleas that were heard in San Francisco only
half a decade ago:
"The crime rate in Chinatown is increasing. We
are partly responsible. We seek a chance to
change and be a productive member of the community:
Frustration is our lot. Housing, job opportunities,
recreation facilities in Chinatown are poor. We
live in an age of technical advance that requires
skill and training to survive.
We are under the same pressures as other youths.
In addition, we are subjected to some that are
unique because we are foreign born.
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We are frustrated in our pursuit of an education
because they do not know how to reach us. As
long as we are undereducated and under-trained,
we will remain under-employed.
The burgeoning. crime rate is largely the result
of these problems." 32
7, Elderly.
There are a substantial number of Chinese elderly persons,
many of who live in the immediate Chinatown area. Ruth Moy,
Director of the Golden Age Center, estimates as many as 1200
elderly persons of an average age of 70 reside in the Greater
Boston Area. This estimate appears reasonable judging from
the 1970 Census. According to the Census the number of per-
sons above 65 today (who were above 60 in 1970) in the city
of Boston alone is approximately 800 or 11% of the entire
Boston Chinese population. Of these 800 elderly persons
approximately 63% are males. Although it is generally recog-
nized that the life span of females exceeds that for males the
predominance of elderly men reflects the fact that prior to
World War II many restrictions barring females from immigrating
to this country were in force. One source indicates that 95%
of Chinatown's population during this period were males, many
of whom were left stranded in the United States as a result of
the Communist take-over of the China Mainland in 1949.34
It is the elderly,as a sub-group who perhaps must endure
the greatest suffering among Chinese-Americans. Having their
roots in a culture vastly different from the dominant one in
which they now reside creates untold alienation, disorienta-
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tion and mental stress. The safeguards provided by the "old
society": the extended family and strong traditions emphasi-
zing respect and veneration for the old, are found to be
greatly weakened in the process of being transfered from the
homeland to America.
Many of the elderly do not have families and lead lonely
destitute lives. Again to quote Mrs. Moy: "many are dis-
tressed and frightened. Many discharged from hospitals are
without friends or family". 3 5
Because few are capable of speaking even "survival En-
glish" and hence are unable to cope with life outside of China-
town they are hopelessly dependent on the local Chinese Com-
munity for both support and security. Only in Chinatown, insu-
lated from the outside world, can they acquire a sense of
belonging and shed their helplessness. As indicated earlier
many have below poverty incomes. Many of the elderly derive
their incomes form old age assistance and social security.
In order to survive many must share small and decrepit one-
room apartments which often do not contain even the simple
amenities such as heat (the tuberculosis rate among Chinese
elderly is exceptionally high).
Compounding the problems of the elderly is the fact that
access to human services have historically been greatly limited,
again due to language and cultural barriers. Limited bilingual
staff in hospitals, governmental agencies, nursing homes, etc.
have in the past inhibited the elderly from seeking and ac-
quiring much needed services.
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8. Community Survival.
Chinatowns which once numbered into the scores are to-
day comparatively few in number. Some died natural deaths.
Others were gradually bulldozed into oblivion. All, however,
were victims of "progress". Whether remaining Chinatowns will
suffer similar fates is still very much open to question.
There are indications, however, that Boston's Chinatown may
be next in line if present trends continue. The continued
survival of the community is an issue that only recently
have community leaders begun to address in earnest.
Urban renewal programs, which flourished in Boston during
the middle part of the century, and natural market forces have
caused irreparable demage to the BCC. Although through active
community protests and negotiations with City Hall further
destruction of the community has been temporarily halted
there are no assurances that further destruction will not take
nlace. A 1963 Memorandum of Agreement signed by then Mayor
Collins, while acknowledging the damage already incurred by
the community as a result of the construction of the South-
east Expressway, the Massachusetts Turnpike, and the expan-
sion of the Tufts New England Medical Center, offers no legally
binding quarentees that Chinese interests will not be further
undermined (for location of these entities see Exhibit 19). 36
Several developments have transpired since the signing
of the agreement which raises serious questions concerning
the future of Boston's Chinatown, the nucleus of the BCC.
The recent development plans of Jordan Marsh to construct
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a $220 million major downtown commercial center adjacent to
Chinatown on Essex Street; the renewed interests in the
development of Park Plaza directly to the west of Chinatown;
and the present construction of the South Station complex to
the east are already beginning to exert "pressures" on the
community (see Exhibit 19 ).
Chinatown's proximity to these developments, its prime
location with respect to major trasportation arteries, and
its accessibility to major governmental, retail, financial,
and entertainment centers have placed at the crossroads of
a rapidly increasing speculative land market. Although Chi-
nese do own a substantial share of the land within Chinatown
this fact alone is no guarentee that Chinatown can maintain
the intergrity of its boundaries. The City need only to
increase property taxes in une area to reflect increased
property values to make uneconomical existing land uses.
There are, in fact, already some indications that current
land uses are not generating sufficient income to cover even
basic operating expenses. As mentioned earlier in Section 4
above the Chinese Merchants Association is currently losing
a substantial sum annually on their residential properties.
The lack of vacant land, costs of assembling real estate par-
cels, and problems associated with resident relocation have to
date inhibited upgrading of current land uses. Yet the pres-
sures for conversion of current land uses to higher or more
intense levels of use are growing. This presents an ever
continuing dilemma for the community. On the one hand there
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is a strong commitment and desire to preserve the neighbor-
hood character of the community and on the other hand a
growing realization that massive community renewal is inevi-
table due to external market forces. Action to resolve this
dilemma is -mandatory if the community is to have any control
over its own destiny.
Although in the shortrun Chinatown may be able to resist
these forces, in the long run it will have to eventually suc-
cumb. Subsidization of existing sup-optimal land uses by
present land owners. can only continue for so long, especially
in face of increasing opportunity costs of non-conversion.
There may however be countervailing influences which could
if introduced help to preserve the sanctity of the community.
The City, if it commits itself towards preserving the com-
munity, may designate Chinatown as a conservation area thus
limiting the nature of redevelopment of the area. To some
extent Chinatown already possessea a veto power over develop-
ments that are proposed within its boundary (i.e. the Business
and Commercial Core). Such power, as previously notedis not
legally binding and has yet to be put to a real test.
9. The Maturation of the Restaurant Industry.
The economy of the Chinese community is based almost
exclusively on its restaurant industry. In the Greater Bos-
ton Area along there exists some 200 Chinese restaurants
(see Exhibit 20). In the area of Chinatown Proper 51 of 72
Chinese business establishments are- linked directly or iiidi-
Page 79EXHIBIT 20
CONCENTRATION OF CHINESE RESTAURANTS
BY LOCALITY
reqter Boston Area
Not inclusive of all restaurants
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rectly to the restaurant industry (see Exhibit 21). All but
$3,416,000 of the estimated $18,512,000 gross annual income
of Chinatown businesses are derived from restaurant related
38enterprises. The predominance of the restaurant industry
in the Chinese economy is further borne out by the dispropor-
tionate share of Chinese employed in the manufacturing of
nondurable goods (i.e. bean sprouts, fortune cookies, noodles,
etc.) and the Wholesale and Retail Trade industries (i.e. impor-
tors ofV food products from the Orient, restaurant supplies,
and restaurants).
As was previously alluded to in the historical narrative
section the predominance of the restaurant industry is attri-
butable to the fact that it was one of few industries not
clbsed to Chinese participation and which could not be usurped
from them. Consequently it has become the mainstay of the
Chinese economy and sustains a major portion of the Chinese
population.
The proliferation of Chinese restaurants, it should be
understood, is not necessarily a result of the fact that it
is especially profitable. Most Chinese restaurant businesses
are "family" owned and operated or have multiple owners
(as many as 25 shareholders). Return on investment is not
a major deciding criteria in most cases justifying opening
a restaurant. As long as the cash flow is sufficient to
cover operating costs the business will likely to be sus-
tained even though it remains unprofitable. A plausible
explanation for this type of behavior is the fact that Chi-
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EXHIBIT 21
The Approximate Breakdown of
Chinese-owned or Chinese patronized
Businesses in Boston Chinatown
Commercial District
Number of Number of
Establishments Employees
Restaurants 25 326
Food Stores 17 86
Gift Shops 7 16
Book Stores 4 39
Printing Shops 3 n.a.
Chinese Movie Theatres 2 n.a.
Chinese Bakeries 2 n.a.
Noodle Manufactories 4 n.a.
Barber Shops 4 n.a.
Travel Agents 5 n.a.
Consulting Firms 2 n.a.
Misc. 5 n.a.
n.a. = Data Not Available
Source: C.E.D.C. Survey.
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nese use a different calculus in determining "profit" than
used by Americans. Typically, the Chinese fail to take into
account the opportunity costs of their own labor in calculating
costs. Instead any return to their labor is attributed to
"profit". This cultural anomaly is deeply embedded in the
minds of Chinese and 4000 years of history which has taught
them that to work and to earn wages above a level necessary
for mere subsistence was, by Chinese standards, indeed "pro-
fitable". The proliferation of Chinese restaurants is there-
fore not dictated by demand conditons nor by profit considera-
tions alone. These factors play a much smaller role in the
descision making process than normally attributed them.
From cursory observation it appears that the major factor
causing the proliferation of Chinese restaurants is the fact
it is the only industry which Chinese are likely to have any
training and experience in. History, by confining the Chinese
to this single industry has, in effect, created a self-perpe-
tuating class of restauranteurs. Although it has yet to be
verified it is probably very likely that if one were to examine
the work history of present owners of restaurants one would
find some previous experience in restaurant related work.
One might hypothesize that because, for many years, the only
route Chinese had to upward mobility was through the restau-
rant industry it became a symbol of status and, like the pro-
verbial basket of fruit, a sign of well-being and success to
own one's own restaurant. The only other major factor con-
tributing to the proliferation of Chinese restaurants is the
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fact that it was one business enterprise that required little
fluency in English.
It is important to note that upward mobility through
the restaurant industry can only occur through ownership or
by attaining the status of head cook. There are no real pro-
tional ladders and no internal job markets in the restaurant
industry as it is now set up. Most jobs available within the
Chinese restaurant industry are low paying, secondary type
jobs. A waiter's job is, for example, characterized by long Mpno-
tonous working hours (typically 10 hours per day, six days
per week), lack of fringe benefits (there are no waiter unions),
and low wages. For the waiter upward mobility may mean scrimping
and saving along with the hope that one day enough capital would
have been accumulated to allow him to start his own restaurant.
As long as there is room for additional Chinese restaurants
in the market a route of upward mobility for the immigrant Chi-
nese is reasonably assured. There are indications, however,
which suggest that the market for Chinese restaurants is rapi-dly
approaching a saturation point, at least within the Boston area.
With over 200 restaurants in the Boston area competitionnhas
become quite keen. One estimate places the percent of success-
39ful restaurants at about 10% of the total. Supply constraints
will also likely prevent further expansion. Lack of capable
chefs and a diminishing number of prime locations will make it
increasingly difficult to open additional restaurants, at least
of the conventional type.
A fully matured restaurant industry with little possiblities
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for further growth presents serious problems for the BCC.
Should the restaurant industry dry up as a major source of
employment and consequently cut off the major route to up-
ward mobility available to Chinese immigrants than a dismal
future is in store for the BCC.
With its immigrant absorptive capacity largely curtailed
the BCC will be threatened with many of the same problems now
confronting her sister communities in New York and San Fran-
cisco. By failing to diversify the BCC has, in effect, placed
"all its eggs in one basket" - the restaurant industry. Its
fate is thus tied to that of the Industry's.
Conclusion.
Chinatowns have traditionally served as receiving points
and transitory way-stations for newly arrived immigrants. They
served these functions reasonable well so long as the influx of
new immigrants remained small and highly selective. In recent
years, however, the rate of immigration has outstripped the
absorptive capacity of Chinatowns. Consequently not only is
it now more difficult for immigrants to acquire entrance into
Chinatowns but also more difficult, once in, to get out. China-
towns are thus beginning to assume many of the characteristics
that characterize full fledged ghettoes. Boston's Chinese
Community is no exception. The warning signals are quite evident;
overcrowding, deteriorating housing conditions, community frag-
mentation, underemployment, juvenile delinquency, and a weak-
ening family structure were among few of the areas examined
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which were indicative of many of the latent problems and so-
cial pathologies threatening to consume the BCC as they have
New York and San Francisco Chinatowns.
The need for economically developing the BCC is
as "real" as the existence of these problems. The fact that
underemployment and underutilization of land is prevalent
within the community also speaks directly to the "real" need
for economic development.
Page 86
CHAPTER VI:. THE "LEGITIMATE" NEED FOR BCO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The debate over whether or not economic development of the
ghetto is the most appropriate prescription for treating the
ills society that impact upon the ghetto has not subsided in
recent years and may have even intensified. The debate is
waged on both philosophical grounds and on the grounds of econo-
mic theory regarding cause and effect and treatment of ghetto
problems. Although the debate centers largely around the Black
ghetto the same arguments can be evoked to argue the case for
and against economic development of the BCC. Not all the argu-
ments, however, will apply with equal force.
The arguments against economic development of the ghetto
are based on what Cumberland describes as "traditional concern
over interference with private enterprise, opposition to exten-
sion of federal powers, and rejection of any program hinting of
central planning".40 Ghetto problems are essentially viewed as
short term manifestations of disequalibrium in market forces.
Government interference is argued to be a major contributing
factor inhibiting natural market forces from adjusting to their
long run equalibrium. Minimum wage requirements, welfare,
government regulation of industries, etc. are viewed by oppo-
nents of ghetto development as already disrupting the market
process to an excessive extent. Further governmental inter-
ference it is argued will aggravate rather than solve problems
giving rise to urban ghettoes.41
Proponents of economic development of the ghetto respond
to these arguments by pointing out that government interference
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is necessary to compensate for the failings of the private
competitive market and that it was imperfections in the mar-
ket process which were the cause of the evolution of ghettoes
and not government interference. They further contend that
poverty is "a vicious cycle" which is supported rather than
attenuated by market forces. 4 2
The economic theoretical grounds on which the debate is
waged are rooted in both macro and micro economic theories.
At the macro level economists once argued that national econo-
mic growth alone would be sufficient to assure elimination of
poverty in America, at least in the "absolute" -sense. The
answer to poverty was therefore not to redistribute portions
of the economic pie but to increase its size.
Increasing the size of the economic pie, however, no lon-
ger holds the promise it once held in the elimination of po-
verty. Although the Economy has continued to grow poverty has
continued to persist. Growth in GNP, it appears, can only do
44
so much in eliminating poverty.
A re-evaluation of the redistributive approach towards
eliminating poverty has thus come into vogue. Elimination
of poverty, at least in the short run, by means of massive
"one-time" redistribution of income is certainly conceivable.
Elimination of poverty in the long run, however, requires
that "wealth", the means of production and distribution, be
redistributed as well. Neither form of redistribution is
likely to receive widespread political support nor acceptance.
Such an approach, although effective in terms of eliminating
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poverty,is completely antithetical to the Capitalist-syst-em and
will never likely be instituted on a meaningful scale.
Although the mold for determining existing patterns
of ownership of the means of production and distribution has
already been cast and for all practical purposes are now
immutable, a mold for determining the future distribution
of ownership over the factors of production has yet to be
shaped. Even though future "molds" will be largely deter-
minded by past "molds" there is still room left for some
modicum of change. This is precisely the kind of changes
that ghetto economic development are designed to achieve.
By concentrating investment in urban ghettoes a more equitable
pattern of ownership of "property" can result and consequently
affect future distributions of income and wealth than other-
wise would have been the case without massive injections of
investment aid.
A more serious and more fundamental challenge to adova-
cates of ghetto development is presented by the micro theories
of John Kain and Joseph Persky. From their theories of house-
hold residential and firm location and the spatial structure of
the metropolis they conblude that "gilding porgrams" aimed at
developing the ghetto as not only being impractical but con-
trary to the national interest of intergration. 45
Although their conclusions are made in reference to Black
ghettoes specifically the same arguments they employ can con-
ceivably also apply to Chinese ghettoes. Two of their argu-
ments are particularly relevant to any discussion about ghetto
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development regardless of the specific ghetto under consi-
deration. The two arguments can be summarized as the fol-
46
lowing:
1) Jobs ghetto residents are most capable of ful-
filling are declining in central cities and
moving into the suburbs. As long as ghetto
residents are confined to central city locations
an increasing jobs-skills mismatch will occur.
Such a situation can only be remedied by dis-
persing ghetto residents to suburban work places.
2) The capital absorption capacity of ghetto com-
munities are low #.nd therefore efforts to deve-
lop ghettoes cannft occur at a pace fast enough
to cross the critical threshold necessary to
overcome ghetto pathologies.
Both arguments have been met with scepticism. The policy
of ghetto dispersal has been criticized on many grounds. The
empirical evidence presented by Kain and Persky on which they
base their conclusions have been challenged by other economists
who provide countervailing empirical evidence. 47Others have
criticized a policy of ghetto dispersal because it understates
the political obstacles that vould have to be overcome in order
48
to carry out such a policy. Those of a more radical persau-
sion argue that ghetto dispersal would result in emasculating
what political clout ghetto residents have been able to amass
and now wield and consequently once again put minorities under
white domination and control.49
Apart from these reasons the dispersal alternative can
be dismissed on the grounds that it overlooks important pro-
perties of the Chinese community which are unique among urban
ghettoes. First, the community serves a very important social
Page 90
function which it alone can provide -- that is the amalgama-
tive function of aiding new immigrants in adjusting to their
new environment. It thus serves an intergrative function
which dispersal would only subvert. Dispersal would not
necessarily accomplish intergration of the Chinese into the
mainstream of Society any better than what process presently
exists. It would however intensify the traumas that new
immigrants experience in a strange and alien culture.
Secondly, even if dispersal were to enhance the "economic life"
of Chinese it would be achieved at the cost of sacrificing
their "communal life". Lastly, and more importantly, the
assumption tha-b gnettoes have low capital absorption capaci-
ties does not necessarily hold true for the BCC. Economic
development of the BCO is potentially viable (as will be
argued later).
Conclusion.
Not only is the need to develop the BCC "real" but it
also holds the only promise for solving the myriad problems
confronting the community. A laissez faire attitude towards
the plight of the Chinese ghetto fails to recognize the com-
petitive disadvantage of Chinese that result from their lan-
guage and cultural handicaps. Alternatives calling for dis-
persal of ghetto residents fail to take into account the im-
portant amalgamative functions Chinese "ghettoes" serve as
receiving points for new immigrants.
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The justification for developing the BCC also goes
beyond merely local BCC concerns. There may well be national
ramifications as well. Increasing opportunities for new
immigrants in the BCC can help shift the burden of absorbing
new immigrants from New York and San Francisco Chinatowns
to the BCC which has a greater absorptive capacity. As long
as the number of new immigrants diverted away from other,
more problem plagued Chinatowns is not too great the pros-
pects for shifting the burden of absorbing new immigrants
more equitably among Chinatowns are good. The fact that
between 100 and 150 newcomers arrive each year to the BOO
from other parts of the Country (many of whom are from other
Chinatowns) in search of- better job opportunities gives some
indication of the need to develop alternative viable communi-
ties to relieve the enormous pressures of overcrowding in
New York and San Francisco. 5 0
Taking these considerations into mind economic develop-
ment therefore appears to be the only alternative which holds
any promise for preventing complete "ghettolization" of the
BCC and for channeling new immigrants to Chinese communities
other than New York or San Francisco Chinatowns. For these
reasons economic development of the BCC is a "legitimate" as
as well as a "real" need.
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CHAPTER VII: THE NEED FOR PLANNED COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BCC
Assuming that economic development of the BOO is justi-
fied on both "real" and "legitimate" grounds the question that
next arises is in what form should economic assistance be given
to the BCC and along what lines should economic development
and growth be patterned. Advocated here is the mode of eco-
nomic development which shall be referred to as Planned Com-
munity Economic Development (PCED).
Towards a Definition of Planned Community Economic Development.
Of foremost importance in establishing the need for
PCED of the BCC is to first define the subject. Comparing
PCED with the present "laissez faire" system of economic
develonment will serve to point out its distinguishing fea-
tures.
Planned Community Economic Development differs from
laissez faire economic development in many important respects.
First PCED emphasizes community rather than individual control
of the development process. Secondly, the process is to a
large extent "planned" with goals other than just profit
maximization. Thirdly, PCED involves the participation of
all segments of the community; i.e. residents, businesses,
community organizations, etc. in all areas of descision
making, responsibilities, and benefits that economic develop-
might entail. Finally PCED, unlike laissez faire economic
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developmentrequires the creation of new institutions and
new ways of organizing production and consumption activities.
Thus PCED involves the use of economic development as a cata-
lyst to affect and to be affected by political and social
development. In more concrete terms it involves what Thomas
Vietoriza and Bennett Harrison describe as:
"Tnstitution-building, and not merely increasing
per capita income. Specifically, we envisage
the creation of a number of 'inside jobs', ac-
quisition by the community of assets both inside
and outside the ghetto, a substantial expansion
of existing black (minority) businesses (parti-
cularly through cooperative forms of ownership),
the large-scale transfer of ghetto property to
ghetto residents and/or the community qua com-
munity, emphasis on the provision of prevoca-
tional and skill training within these ghetto
enterprises, and local control of infgrastruc-
ture such 5 s schools, police, and health faci-
lities.", 5f
In a strictly economic and operational sense PCED can
be broadly construed as the process by which the 'community'
acquires and invests scarce resources in those activities
which generate benefits maximizing the community's social
welfare as defined by the community through the
political process . Broadly stated as such this definition
identifies the major ingredients which when combined make
nossible PCED. These necessary ingredients include:
1) resources with which to invest (i.e. "investment
resources")
2) activities which to invest in (i.e. "investment
opportunities")
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3) criteria by which investments are to be judged and
ranked (i.e. "goals and objectives" as reflected in
the community's social welfare function)
4) a plan intergrating all the above (i.e. "economic
development plan")
5) a development catalyst to implement the economic
development plan (i.e. "community development
agent")
A further elaboration on the specific nature of these "ingre-
dients" may prove useful.
1. Investment Resources.
Investment resources, as the the term is used here, re-
fers to the three major factors of production; land, capital,
and labor, all of which are necessary to produce all goods
and services. One distinguishing feature which differentiates
one investment resource from another -- from an investment
point of view -- is the ease with which a investment resource
can be converted to "money". Investment resources can thus
be ranked according to how "liquid" they are. For purposes
of investment acquiring resources of high liquidity is pre-
ferred over those of low liquidity. This is so primarily
because more liquid resources have more flexibility in their
use and as such can always be converted into less liquid
assets. It goes without saying that communities with resources
having low liquidity factors will be confined to a limited
range of investment activities. A community, for example, which
utilizes volunteer community labor as a form of "sweat equity"
will find the convertiblity of volunteer time into monetary
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equivalents dependent upon the marketability of the skills
of its volunteers. For purposes of using sweat equity as
matching funds for federal grants the market value of its
volunteer force becomes an important factor in determining
the availability of investment resources to the community.
2. Investment Opportunities.
Investment opportunities can be thought of as falling
into two general categories: investment in people and
investment in place. Investment in place can occur either
through investment in social infrastructure (i.e. parks)
or investment in the local economy (i.e. business ventures).
Investment in people can occur through either investment in
social service programs (i.e. health care) or investment in
human capital (i.e. job training). Each form of investment
can potentially benefit the community although in admittedly
in different degrees. Each can also affect economic develop-
ment and growth. For example, investment in social infrastruc-
ture by making the community a more attractive place to live
can also make it a more attractive place to invest.
The question regarding which pblicy: investment in people
or investment in place is more approrriate in enhancing the
welfare of ghetto residents is a subject of much debate.
Cumberland, in his discussion of "Aid to place vs . aid to
people" concludes that aid to people is the correct policy
to follow since it is the welfare of people that any economic
development policy is ultimately directed at. 'He rationalizes
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his position as follows:
"While regional development programs are often
justified upon the humanitarian basis of aiding
the needy, there is no guarantee that creating
jobs will provide employment for the locally
umemployed, if they do not have the required
education, skills, and production capabilities.
Unless carefully designed, regional aid programs
benefit the affluent and the established rather
than the needy who serve as the rationalization
for heavy expenditures. Spending large sums
on new factories and public works is unlikely
to benefit the umemployed unless special efforts
are made to help overcome the handicaps which
contribute to their initial unemployment... A
good case can be made that the most effective
way to invest heavily in human capital through
improved programs of education, retraining,
health, family planning, relocation assistance
and removal of discrimination." 52
Cumberland's arguments are remarkably similar to those made
by Kain and Persky. Proponents for dispersal are thus essen-
tially arguing for investment in people as opposed to invest-
ment in place.
Bennett Harrison in his discussion of "Investment in
People vs . Investment in Place" takes an opposing view
point. Harrison argues that investment in people is not
sufficient alone to improve individual welfare but must be
complemented by investment in place. He offers two reasons
why this must be so:
"...In particular, increases in income no longer
necessarily lead to improved access (to jobs,
housing, open space, or the central business
district), especially when the irregular availa-
bility of transport links and discrimination in
capital, housing, education, and labor markets
are accounted for...This creates one rationale
for 'investment in place'".
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A second rationale depends on an important aspect
of welfare economics concerning 'public goods'.
Private, decentralized markets will 'fail' to pro-
duce adequate quantities of the goods and services
the consumntion of which is at least nartly col-
lective (and therefore indivisible)... If-the inter-
neighborhood distribution of such services is not
'equal", i.e., if the per capita distribution is
not roughly rectangular, then the only completely
effective policy will be 'investment in place'--
public investment in the physical and human capi-
tal of the neighborhoods which have been short-
changed by the operations of the market." 53
Thus in Harrison's view both investment in place as well as
investment in people are justified. Cumberland~while recog-
nizing that creating jobs alone is not sufficient to enhance
the welfare of ghetto residents
if they lack the skills and
know-how to fill those jobs fails to recognize that it equally
makes little sense to upgrade the skills and know-how of ghetto
residents if jobs utilizing such skills and know-how are not
available if only because of discrimination in the job mar-
ket.
In order for economic development to proceed a balanced
strategy emphasizing both investment in place and investment
in people is therefore necessary. Accepting this conclusion
investment opportunities can now be classified into five
categories; 1) social infrastructure (eg. parks), 2) social
service programs (e.g. health care), 3) human capital (e.g
job training, 4) business enterprise (e.g. commercial store),
and 5) land development (e.g. housing development).
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3. Goals and Objectives.
Determining the ultimate goals and objectives of economic
development will have an important bearing on what strategies
and priorities are adopted in implementing and economic develop-
ment program. A goal, for example, emphasizing helping ghetto
residents to attain American "middle classdom" will imply a
different set of economic strategies than one which emphasizes
autarchic development of the ghetto. It is therefore necessary
to specify precisely what goals economic development are directed
to achieve. As to how and by whom goals are to be established
is largely dependent upon the political process which must
reconcile the often conflicting goals of competing interests.
4. Economic Development Plan.
Once the goals and objectives of economic development
have been spelled out a plan is required detailing the role of
economic development towards the attainment of these goals and
objectives. Such a plan must include the following:
1) Identification of major constraints; whether it be
resource, political, legal, etc.
2) Specification of measures to be used in determining
"progress" towards goals and objectives.
3) Specification of descision making processes -- i.e.
who decides upon investments and how are the bene-
fits that accrue from such an investment to be dis-
tributed.
4) Identification of sources of potential investment
resources and the means by which they might be
"tapped".
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5) Identification of potential investment opportunities.
6) Identification of specific development strategies
to be employed.
7) Identification of development tools available (e.g.
SBA Local Development Corporation).
While it is useful to talk about and devise an overall
development plan.in practice it is often difficult to imple-
ment. Planned Community Economic Development is itself some-
what of a misnomer. Only when the development agent has total
control over factors affecting development can there truly be
PCED. In assystem where power centers are widely decentralized
and decisions are made in concert with diverse independent
interests PCED becomes subject to the whims and inclinations
of numerous interest groups over which a PCED development agent
exercises little control. In such an environment a development
plan becomes not so much something which serves to "guide" the
development agent as something which must be "sold" by the
development agent to the "rest of the world".
The development plan therefore is used as a kind of position
statement rather than as a guide for action. Embodied in the
plan is essentially the compremises, concessions, and agreements
that are made in arriving at a general consensus among community
members as to what PCED should entail and how it should be exe-
cuted. The development plan thus expresses the values, priori-
ties, and aspirations of the community. As such it is a medium
of communication. It can also be used to monitor the community's
designated development agent to see where it follows and where
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it departs from what it was orginally intended to do. Finally,
a development plan gives impetus to social and physical planning
that mutually complement and reinforce economic planning.
5. Development Agent.
A development agent, invested in which are the necessary
resources and authority to carry out PCED.is the final ingre-
dient necessary to undertake ghetto economic development.
Ideally the develorment agent should be accountable to those
controlling the investment resources to be used in the develop-
ment program, those whose welfare are the ultimate immediate
concern and object of economic development, and those who
are indirectly affected by externalities generated in the
economic development process. To what degree a development
agent must be accountable to each, however, a subject of
considerable debate. The debate is complicated by the fact
that these three parties to economic development need not be
mutually exclusive.
A development agent can be of two types; an "endogenous"
or "exogenous" development agent. An endogenous development
agent "emerges from forces inside of the community; and
correspondingly, the development resources are controlled and
supervised by ghetto interests".54 In constrast the exogenous
development agent "emerges from forces and circumstances that
rest outside of the boundaries of the ghetto community: and
the resources of such agents are also controlled and super-
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vised from that point".55 The distinction between the two is
somewhat muddled by the fact that in the real world neither
exists in their purest form. By definition PCED implies a
development process which utilizes an endogenous development
agent.
A Rationale for Planned Community Economic Development:
The rationale for PCED is based on the assumption that
"meaningful" economic development has not and will not likely
be forthcoming from the Drivate sector and consequently-the
initiative for development must come from the community itself.
There are essentially three reasons why "meaningful" economic
development will not likely occur through the private sector.
First, the amount of privat-e investment forthcoming from
the private sector will not likely be sufficient to generate
meaningful jobs of the kind and quantity needed. The non-
Chinese segment of the private sector has no more reason to
invest in the Chinese community than it does in any urban
ghetto except in limited cases where access to cheap Chinese
labor is desired. What potentially profitable ventures do
exist are outside the realm of experience of both non-Chinese
and Chinese segments of the private sector. Non-Chinese are
precluded from taking advantage of these opportunities because
of language and cultural barriers (this is evidenced by the
fact that few, if any, non-Chinese open Chinese restaurants).
The Chinese segment of the private sector is likewise precluded
from exploiting many opportunities by a lack of business know-
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how and investment resources.
Secondly, because the private sector is motivated pri-
marily by profit considerations it will likely underinvest in
"public good" (goods that must be consumed collectively).
Finally, privately generated economic development fails
to redress the inbalance in income and wealth between the BCC
and the "outside world" and within the BCC itself. Such an
inbalance can only be redressed, as noted in Chapter III,
through a redistribution of ownership and control of factors
of production and distribution. Therefore in order for
"meaningful" economic development to occur ownership and con-
trol over factors of production and distribution must be vested
in the "community" to the greatest extent practicable. For
only through such ownership and control can the community
secure economic and subsequently political power, the lack of
which are viewed to be the major contributing factor to the
continued impoverishment of ghetto communities.5 6
Deficiencies in the private sector to generate "meaningful"
economic development can be somewhat remedied by PCED. As its
own development agent the community can utilize a different
method for calculating benefits and costs and therefore
not restrict itself solely to profit considerations. Through
PCED the community can invest in " public goods" and recoup
the benefits that accrue from such investment. Because the
community can internalize externalities to a greater extent
than a private investor investment decisions will reflect
external social costs and benefits as well as private costs
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and benefits. It is thus conceivable, from a social cost-
benefit accounting point of view that a venture which has
a negative cash flow may still be "profitable". The trade
off between monetary and non-monetary benefits is something
to be considered in PCED which is usually ignored by private
investors.
Whereas the flow of private investment may not be forth-
coming under private initiative it may be suscentible to stimu-
lation by a community develooment agent. PCED can facilitate
private investment by: l)performing intermediary functions in
bringing together investment resources, onportunities, and
entreoreneurial talent by reducing search costs for investors
looking for investments and entrepreneurs looking for investors,
2) providing technical assistance, and 3) offering various
tynes of incentives. In situations where investors or entre-
preneurs or both are lacking a community develooment agent
under PCED can take the initiative and assume one or both
roles itself.
Finally PCED, more than any other- economipc development
strategy, addresses directly the issue of ec:onomiahand political
powerlessness of ghetto communities. PCEDby concentrating
ownership and control of local economic institutions in the
hands of the community as a collective entity rather than in
the hands of private individuals, insures that the community
is not exploited by orivate individuals for personal gain and
that everyone benefits rather than just a few. This is not
to say, however, that PCED must necessarily preclude private
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ownership and control over factors of production which would
be undesirable and imrractical given social and political
realities of the present. A balance needs to be struck where
both individual and community interests are represented equally.
Aside from the rationale that PCED has the potential to
overcome important deficiencies of the private sector two other
justifications for PCED needs to be considered. One is that
PCED, if executed by an accertable community development agent,
allows the community access to resources not available To the
private sector. Public assistance and -private foundation
grants of course make u-n the bulk of such resources. Some
srecific PCED type entities such as a federally funded Community
Develorment Corporation (CDC) can also acquire funds from
private sources as well. The second rationale for PCED is
that because it requires participation from all sectors of
the community it can act as a catalyst to develop the community
socially. By involving residents in - decision making
PCED can have an important effect on community residents to
assume leadership positions and to engage in a democratic pro-
cess. This is especially important for the Chinese communitr
which is not accustomed in dealing with the American system
on a political level. Tmmigrants, in particular, have not been
accustomed to taking an active role in governing their own
lives'. To the extent that resources are available to fund
PCED an incentive for the community to coonerate ard work
together in order to acouire such funds, exists.
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Geoffrey Faux in his "Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Community Development Corporations" lists
a number of other justifications for PCED. He justifies
locally controlled development programs as:57
1) '.-having demonstrated their potential for assisting
the poor and disadvantaged to intergrate into the
nations's social and economic mainstream.
2) ... disolaying a unique capacity for pooling7 a com-
munity's talents and resourcestfor increasing
ownership of businesses, homes, and other property
among the urban poor: for developing entrepreneurial
and managerial talent: for linking together a variety
of businesses and projects for mutual reinforcement
and support: and for organizing the community to
accept and effectively utilize resources and assis-
tance from outside the poverty area.
3) ...being more flexible and responsive to local needs
and conditions than are organizations which have
been designed in Washington.
4) ...being compatible with and can reinforce the
efforts of individual entrepreneurs and outside
investors to build up the economy of the ghetto.
Although PCED is not alone sufficient to insure that
uoverty will forever be eliminated from central cities it
is nevertheless a necessary step in that direction. Other
strategies which have been attempted have proven to be failure.5:
This is not say that PCIED should be substituted in their place
but that together,in concertthey may have a better chance in
succeeding than if they operated singularly and separately.
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PART III
POTENTIALS FOR PLANNED
COMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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CHAPTER VIII: INVESTMENT POTENTIALS.
Identified as a necessary condition for developing the
BCC along PCED lines is access of the community to surplus
generating investment opportunities. It is generally ar-
gued that investment opportunities of this nature are severely
limited in most ghetto communities. This is so, it is argued,
because all exploitable investment opportunities are likely
to have already been usurped by the private sector. Profit
generating ventures within ghetto communities are thus consi-
dered difficult to come by, especially for a late coming
community development agent. This, however, does not appear
to be the case for the BCC.
For reasons mentioned in Chapter VI of Part II there
may well be investment opportunities in the BCC which have
yet to be exploited. Moreover, these investment opportunities
arnear to be of such a specific nature that they can ohly be
properly exploited by Chinese. If investment opportunities
are as abundant as they apnear to be PCED of the BCC is indeed
potentially viable. The uniquesness of the BCC situation
which makes PCED such a real possibility is outlined below.
An Overview of Investment Opportunities in the BCC.
Investment opportunities in all five areas -- i.e. social
infrastructure, social service programs, human capital, capital
enterprises, and land development are viewed by many observers
of the BCC to be plentiful. As noted by one observer of the
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community: "the Chinese Community can drown itself in
opportunities". Due to restrictions in time and space,
however, only potentials for investments in capital enter-
prises and land develorment will be discussed here. These
two areas of investment are considered the most critical
since they lead to capital formation which is essential if
the community is to develop a base for economic and political
power.
The key to successful economic development of the BCC
will depend upon the community's ability to convert liabili-
ties into assests -- that is to say its ability to exploit
its "situation",which if left unexploited or exploited by
others could eventually mean the demise of the community.
What was previously defined as liabilities of the BCC; namely
language and cultural barriers, an economic base centered
around a single industry, a raridly emerging speculative land
market, etc., can from another perspective be viewed as poten-
tial assets. A closer examination of what was initially con-
ceived as liabilities will point out the many latent potentials
they have as assets.
The presence of a Jordan Marsh compnlex or a Park Plaza
development need not represent threats but can be viewed
as bestowing "wind fall" benefits to the community. If the
community should itself assume the role of land speculator
and land developer and begin to exploit and capitalize on its
locational advantage it stands to gain a major portion of the
full benefits of all increments in increasing land values and
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opportunities that ensue. If it fails to take advantage of
its situation a quantrum leap in adjustment may be required
at some future date in order to equalibriate land use at an
intensity consistent with property values. Thus instead of
change occuring gradually over time massive and abrupt changes
may be in store: changes which will surely disrupt if not
destroy the community as it is known today. Los Angeles
Chinatown, Stockton Chinatown, and San Francisco Japantown
provide very clear exampoles of what can happen to a community
that waits until it is too late to act and the initiative for
action is passed on to "outsiders".2 Thus while the presence
of surrounding developments make it impossible for the community
to continue as it is their presence at the same time provide
an unorecedented opportunity for the community to significantly
upgrade itself through land development. By riding the tide
of progress instead of resisting it as other Chinatowvns have
attempted to do the BCC can not only avert being consumed by
it but can also enjoy all the benefits it brings in its wake.
Likewise, the fact that the community is so economically
dependent upon the restaurant industry need not be considered
a constraint but instead can prove to be the key to further
economic development and growth. Tn having a restaurant
industry the BCC is more fortunate than other ghetto communi-
ties which nay not even have its own economic base. The
existence of the restaurant industry provides ample opportuni-
ties for establishing what Albert Hirshmann, a noted development
economist, terms "backward" and "forward linkages". 3 In layman's
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terms developing such "linkages" refers to a strategy of inter-
gra.ting backward or forward into other facets of the same and
related industry(s). Oportunities for establishing such
linkages are abundant in the BOO. With over 200 Chinese res-
taurants in the Greater Boston Area alone a "critical mass"
has been achieved which can support a number of ancillary
industries. Beldon Daniels, in a recent CEDC conference,
especially noted the real possibilities of establishing such
"secondary industries".4
Another previously defined liability, like the restaurant
industry and the speculative land market, namely language and
cultural barriers can also be converted into an asset if consi-
dered in a different light. Viewed from a different vantage
point language and cultural barriers can be exploited to the
advantage of the community. Although such barriers prevent
Chinese from entering the American mainstream they also, at
the same time, prevent non-Chinese from invading the Chinese
"substream". To the extent that Chinese have a monopoly over
their culture they have sole control in deciding how it can
be "commercialized". Chinese restaurants are certainly a case
in noint in which Chinese successfully exploited their language
and cultural "disadvantage".
The reversed viewpoint of looking upon liabilities as
assets tentatively points out a number of potential areas for
investment. They include: 1) non-basic Chinese population
serving industries, 2) Chinese food and related industries,
3)Other Supporting and Miscellaneous Industries, and 4)land
Development.
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A more detailed enumeration of the opportunities that exist in
each of these sectors is given below.
Non-Basic Chinese Population Serving Industries.
A major potential area for investment lies in non-basic
population serving industries which cater to the specific needs
and tastes of Chinese. Some insights as to what these poten-
tials might be can be acquired by examining and comparing the
BCC with other Chinese communities. Such a comparative analysis,
in assuming that Chinese communities share many similiarities
and tend to follow farily consistent patterns of development,
will be useful in pointing out tentative correlations between
the existence of various business institutions in each community
and relevant parameters which determine their existence. Exhi-
bit 22 presents the results of a cursory comparative study of
six Chinese communities located in New York, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Oakland, and Boston. A list of businese
establishments owned by and employing Chinese was compiled for
each community. As is indicated by Exhibit 22 wide variations
do exist between the different Chinese communities in terms of
the various business establishments each support. These dif-
ferences we hypothesize are attributable to variations in four
basic characteristics which differentiate one community from
another. These characteristics are; 1) the size of the Chine-se
porulation in each community, 2) the degree of "compactness"
of the community, 3) the level of tourism within each community,
and 4) imnortance of the community as a regional center. The
EXHIBIT 22
CROSS SECTIONAL SURVEY OF BUSINESSES
OWNED BY AND EMPLOYING CHINESE
IN SIX CHINESE C"MUNITIES7
TYPE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
Restaurant
Regular
Banquet
Fast Food
w/entertainment
Dim Sum
Sea Food
Grocery Stores
Bakeries
Gift and Curio
Shops
Fish and/or
Poultry
Butcher Shop
Press Duck
Jewerly
Book Store
New York
Chinatown
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
San Francisco
Chinatown
Los Angeles
Chinatown
3
3
3
3
3
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Chicaqo Oakland
Chinatown Chtnatown
3
3
1
1
2
1
3
3
3
2
1
1
3
2 2
KEY: (1) Nonexistent, (2) Limited, (3)
Boston
Chinatow
1
1
2
Iii
0
<H
Sufficient
continued...
TYPE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
Art Store
Furniture
Store
Martial Arts
School
Liquor Store
Bean Curd
Producer
Fortune Cookie
Manufacturer
Almond Cookie
Manufacturer
Noodle Factory
Laundry
Laundrymat
Dry Cleaner
Travel Agency
Automotive Repair
Trucking Co.
New York
Chinatown
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
San Francisco
Chinatown
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
3
3
2
Los Angeles
Chinatown
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
1
1
Chicaoo
Chinatown
Oakl and
Chinatown
Boston
Chinatown
1
1
3
2
2
1
1
1
<D
MH--
continued...
'IYPE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
New York
Chinatown
San Francisco
Chinatown
Los Angeles
Chinatown
Chicago Oakland Boston
Chinatown Chinatown Chinatown
Printing Shop
Bean Sprout
Factory
Herb Store
Ice Cream
Store
Movie Theater
Real Estate
Broker's Office
Barber Shop
Beauty Parlor
Optaetrist
Doctor
Dentist
Garment Factory
Irporter
Hardware
Shoe Store
Clothing
Store
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3 1
1
1
1
00
'IYPE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
New York
Chinatown
San Francisco
Chinatown
Los Angeles
Chinatown
Gas Station
Electronics Co.
Bars
Tourist
Attraction
Accounting
Fim
Law Firm
Insurance
Fim
Pestaurant
Supplies
Funeral
Parlor
Photography
Studio
Flower Shop
Fruit Stand
Construction
Fim
*
1.
3
This represents only a "wind shield survey"
Chicago
Chinatown
Oakland
Chinatown
Boston
Chinatown
1
-i-
1
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
l1
1
1.2
3
3
3
1
1.
1
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
l1
1
1
2
1
l .
3
3
3
?5
2
1
1
2
1 1
S
1
H
H
and therefore may not be accurate
Page 120
six communities have been classified relative to each other
according to these basic characteristics as shown in Exhibit
23.
It is not surprising to learn that Chinese communities
which ranked high in all four categories (i.e. New York and
San Francisco Chinatowns) also contained the broadest economic
base in terms of number and type of business enterprises they
are capable of supporting. In contrast, Oakland and Boston
Chinatowns which had relatively low rankings, were found to
possess comparatively narrower economic bases.
Although not undertaken in the present survey it would be
useful to correlate each of the four variables at different
points in time with the emergence of each type of business
enterprise for each community. By doing so it may be possible
to predict, to some extent, a pattern of develonment for the BCC
along the lines followed by more advanced and mature Chinese
communities. There are several intuitive reasons why one might
'expect the BCC to develop along similar lines as her larger
sister communities. One reason is the tremendous growth
in population in the past decade experienced by the BCC in
both the size of its population and restaurant industry (see
Exhibit 24). Both these developments were typical of larger,
now more established Chinese communitiesin their early stages
of growth. A second reason is the fact that many of the social
and economic institutions appear to be developing in somewhat
parallel lines. At the initial stages of development only
limited numbers and tynes of commercial institutions may be
EXHIBIT 23
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKING OF SIX CHINATOWNSBY SELECTED CRITERIA
Gize of
Chinese Population
Degree of
Compactness
Level of
Tourism
Importance as
Regional Center
New York Relatively Large
(70,182)
Relatively
High
Relatively Relatively
High High
San Francisco Relatively Large Relatively
High
Relatively Relatively
High High
(59,079)
Los Angeles Relatively Moderate Relatively
Low
Relatively Relatively
Moderate Moderate
C27,279)
Relatively Small
C8 , 876)
Relatively Small
(11,972)
Relatively
Moderate
Relatively
Low
Relatively Relatively
Moderate High
Relatively
Low
Relatively
Low
Relatively Low
(7,163)
Relatively
Low
Relatively Relatively
Low Moderate
Chicago
Oakland
Boston
N)
H
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EXHIBIT 24
CHINESE RESTAURANTS IN CHINATOWN
AND OTHER PARTS OF GREATER BOSTON
(194-=7
1940 1950 1960 1970
CHINATOWN
Other Parts of'
Greater Boston
TOTAL
Sources:
267
7
25 14
59
14 36
25
90 121
84 104 146
1940-1970: Chinatown Planning Proect, 1971
(Authors used 1940, 19 and 1960
Boston Area Yellow Pages Directories'j
1976: 1976 Boston Area Yellow Page Directory
* Not inclusive of all restaurants
1976
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foundi restaurants and grocery stores being the most common.
Further development is marked by increasing specialization
and a greater variety of commercial establishments. Once the
community acquires such institutions as its own real estate
brokers office, insurance agency, etc. development of the
community can be judged to be fairly well along.
With respect to the BCC the threshold of development at
which highly specialized service industries begin to appear
is just beginning to be approached. The emergence of a Chinese
bakery and Chinese movie theaters in recent years is evidence
of the coming of age of the BCC. Potentials for establishing
other population supporting industries needs further investi-
gation. As a guide, however, Exhibit 22 points out a number
of local businesses that, while presently non-existent or
existing to a limited extent only, may be viable candidates
for new venture enterprises. At the same time it is clear
that as part and parcel of any economic development strategy
increasing tourism and the surburban asian trade,both as a
means of generating the necessary volume of trade to support
new businesses and as ends in themselves, are important factors
determining the viability of each individual project. Thus the
timing and sequencing of introducing new businesses become
important considerations as they influence tourism and trade
and visa versa.
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Chinese Food and Related Industries.
There are numerous aspects of the Chinese food and
related industries sector in which there exists investment
opnortunities in both new and on-going businesses. Much of
these opportunities are directly or indirectly tied to the
$250,000,000 restaurant industry.5 As mentioned previously
a "critical mass" has been achieved within the restaurant
industry which opens up opportunities for establishing
secondary industries. Further development in the Chinese
food industry is made possible by the rapidly expanding
popularity- of Chinese foods and cuisines. In all areas
of food production, wholesaling, distribution, processing,
and retailing potentials for investment appear to be favorable.
Many factors have contributed to the increased demand for
Chinese food products, not the least of which was President
Nixon's 1972 trip to China. Other factors include the in-
creasing accessibility of Chinese cuisines, the rise in recent
years in the number of Asian immigrants, the growing interest
in health foods, and the "general increase of interest among
6
Americans in international cuisines and cultures". The
tremedous growth in the restaurant industry in recent years
alone suggests to some extent that the demand for Chinese
foods have broadened considerably.
The Wall Street Journal reports that demand for fresh
Chinese produce among households have risen rapidly in the
past few years. One large supermarket chain based in Califor-
nia (Lucky Stores Inc.' was reported, for example, to have
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exrnerienced a 25 times increase in the demand for bean sprouts
since 19737 Increased demand has encouraged many supermarket
chains to stock Chinese food products such as bok choy, snow
peas, napa cabbage, bean sprouts, ginger root, bean curd (to-
fu), won-ton skin, egg-roll wrappers, and noodles.
The market for Chinese vegetables alone is calculated, by one
wholesaler to be $100,000,000 a year. The increased demand
for Chinese food products, however, appears to be more regional
at the present time than national: the coastal regions having
experienced the greatest spurt in demand. Along with increasing
Popularity of Chinese cuisine and fresh raw food produce have
anpeared on the market a number of canned or packaged pre-
cooked foods. Birds-Eye, for example, recently introduced to
the market frozen Chinese vegetables. Chung King and La Choy
are two other nationally distributed brand names that have
begun to market Chinese food products. Although documented
evidence is meager it does arpear to be the case that Chinese
foods are gaining in acceptability and popularity among the
American public. Such foods as bean sprouts and bean curd
have even transcended beyond their identification as Chinese
foods. Considering the number of products that have yet to be
introduced to the American market noetntials for expanding and
opening existing and new markets appear to be favorable in
the many facets of the Chinese food industry. A more detailed
discussion of potentials in each of these facets is presented
below.
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1. Food Production.
Presently most Chinese food produce are produced on small
farms by Chinese, Japanese, Filipinoes, and even some Cauca-
sians. For the most part these farms are to be found in
California: particularly in areas located in the Sacremento
Region, South San Francisco Bay Area, Oxnard, and Coachella
Valley A few Chinese vegetable farms can be found in Florida,
New Jersey, and New Hampshire. In total these farms however
only account for a portion of all Chinese produce consumed in
the United States. Much of the fresh produce and particularly
canned specialty items are imported. Mexico is a major source
of Chinese vegetables,especially during the winter months. 1 2
Most of the Mexican produced vegetables are distributed through-
out the country via Los Angeles. The more exotic specialty
items such as bamboo shoots, water chestnuts, black mushrooms,
etc. are imported from the Orient. Thus much of the Chinese
food. stuffs consumed in the Boston area are imported from
outside the State either directly or indirectly through New
York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The few exceptions
include such items as bean sprouts and bean curd which tend
be produced locally.
The fact that much of the Chinese produce consumed in
Massachusetts are imported (as is most of Massachusetts's
food stuffs) suggests a potential economic development stra-
tegy of substituting locally produced for imported produce.
This strategy of import substitution may potentially prevent
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further job and capital leakages from the conm'nity from occuring,
Whether such a strategy is feasible with respect to Chinese
produce needs tb be further investigated. With the establish-
ment of a sizable restaurant industry and a growing market for
Chinese produce the local market does appear to be sufficient
in size to support local farms. Whether climatic and. soil
conditions are favorable to such production is not yet known
and also warrants further investigation. The applicability
of hydrophonics should also be looked into as an alternative
to present agricultural methods. Tts success in the production
of bean sprouts certainly lends credence to such techniaues.
Expanding the production capacity of already existing
producers (which in the case of the BCC is exclusivrely limited
to bean snrouts producers) offers a much less soeculative
possibility. Presently there are three bean sprout growers
in the BCC with a combined total sales volume of $5 million
a year.1 3 These bean sprout growers serve a regional market
and are rrimary sunpliers of most Chinese restaurants and
grocery and surpermarkets in the region. Henry Tze of CEDC
estimates that 1f of restaurant food costs are attributable
to this "crispy sprout"4 4 The Boston Globe projects that de-
mand for bean sprouts is likely to continue to rise as more
Chinese restaurants expand into suburbia and as health
enthusiasts discover its low calorie, high. vitamin and
15
mineral contents. According to CEDC sources the market for
bean sprouts is such that it warrants expanding bean snrout
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production.
2. Food Manufacturing.
The preparation,processing, and packaging of Chinese
foods for restaurant and consumer markets affer other areas for
investment. Chinese food manufacturing has. largely been
limited and generally confined to a few basic products such
as to-fu, noodles, fortune cookies, etc. In recent years,
however, Chinese food manufacturing has gradually been
expanded to include other items such as egg rolls, "baus",
various Chinese dumplings ("dim sum"), and a host of canned
goods. With the exception of Beatrice Inc. (La Choy) and
General Foods (Chung King) most manufacturers of Chinese
foods are small local business concerns who serve local
regional markets.
A major segment of the market for pre-prepared Chinese
foods is surprisingly the restaurant industry. Restaurants
are finding it increasingly more profitable to contract out
for certain pre-prepared foods than to provide such items
internally. Techniques of mass production and greater
specialization and division of labor allow manufacturers of
certain foods (i.e. egg rolls) to produce their "specialties"
more efficiently and cheaply than can be achieved by the
individual restaurant. With the proliferation of Chinese
restaurants in recent years food contracting may become fur-
ther utilized but limited primarily to "dim sum" type items.
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Supplementing the restaurant market for manufactured
Chinese foods is what appears to be an emerging consumer
market. The fact that a firmthe size of General Foods,
has begun to market canned and packaged Chinese foods is
certainly a significant indication that a consumer market
does indeed exist. The quality of foods prepared by such
large manufacturers as General Foods however is inferior to
what can be purchased in Chinese restaurants and in fact
cannot truly be considered authentic Chinese food. Tech-
niques for processing, preserving, and packaging Chinese
foods have not yet been sufficiently advanced to make manu-
factured foods marketable except for a limited range of
items. Yet even within this limited range there exists
dozens out of the hundreds of Chinese food products that,
at least from the technical point of view are marketable.
Should the technical obstacles be overcome the potentials
for Chinese food manufacturing would be limited only by
the market. Considering the fact that Chinese food is time
consuming and difficult to prepare most consumer households
must either patronize Chinese restaurants or purchase it in
pre-prepared, pre-mixed, or pre-ccoked forms. Getting the
American public to accept Chinese food out of a can or package
appears not to be the major problem in view of the number of
such products already on the market. This is not to under-
state however the difficulties in marketing new products.
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Potentials for investment in Chinese food manufacturing
are enhanced by the fact that there are literally hundreds
of Chinese dishes, spices, and food products developed over
4000 years of Chinese history yet to be introduced to the
American market. William Leong of CEDC describes one such
product:
"...there are a number of other unexploited mar-
kets upon which the Chinese can capitalize. An
example of such an area is the "J'ai" bean pro-
ducts typically used by the monks in China as
meat substitutes. This high protein food can
be treated with favoring and effectively be
substituted for chicken and beef products. With
the health food interests which have been growing
over the oast few years it may be a profitable
enterprise. However, this requires an investi-
gation into the production of J'ai from a feasi-
bility stand point. At the present time, the
only production of these products are done in
Hong Kong for a srecialized market."1 6
Although one would not expect the American public to
substitute steak and potatoes for Chinese foods there does
aprear to exist potential markets for Chinese food products.
The quality of the food manufactured and the marketing
stategies employed to "move" the product will determine
whether such potentials can be realized. The success of
of Chinese vegetables and other "basic" products suggests
that products new to the American can succeed.
3. Food Wholesaling and Distribution.
Chinese entry into the wholesaling and distribution
ends of the food industry in Boston is generally confined
to Chinese food. products. Most existing producers and
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manufacturers (Chinese) maintain their own wholesaling and
distribution operations. Wholesaling and distribution of
imrorted Chinese food products are also generally handled
by Chinese firms. Wholesalers and distributors of non-
Chinese food products however are currently dominated by
non-community, non-Chinese firms. Considering7 that a
sizable portion of the $130,000,000 spent by Chinese res-
taurants in the Greater Boston area are for food inputs
purchased from wholesalers and distributors of meats, poul-
try, fish, non-Chinese vegetables, etc. it is reasonable to
conclude that the existing network of food wholesalers and
distributors represent an important source of "leakage" from
the community. 7 "Plugging" such leaks is an important part
of the overall economic development strategy of the community..
Substituting Chinese and preferably community owned for the
present network of non-Chinese food wholesaling and distri-
bution outlets is potentially feasible if only because Chinese
prefer to deal with other Chinese who can provide better
customer service by bridging language and cultural gaps.
The precedent certainly exists in San Francisco and New York
Chinese communities. Whether the volume of business is suffi-
cient in the Boston Chinese Community to warrant entry into
these areas is not known and requires further investigation.
From a very cursory point of view there does, however,
appear to be favorable indications. CEDC is, for example,
is presently examining the potentials for establishing a
shellfish distribution firm. Another likely candidate may
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be a meat distribution firm. Currently Chinese restaurants
are estimated to purchase close to $50 million worth of meat
annually. 1 8ost of the meat purchased originates from Chicago
plants and are sold through local meat wholesalers to Chinese
restaurants at a 2% to 10% markup.1 9  Thusat a minimum,a
drain of M,000,000 from the community occurs annually. Es-
tablishing a Chinese meat distributing firm either owned or
operated by a community development corporation, or an
affiliation of independent Chinese restaurants, or a mixture
of both can potentially halt the drain on money and jobs from
the community.
Identification of food inputs used by Chinese restaurants
and costing out each of these inputs for the entire industry
is necessary to reveal other tentatively potential areas
for which "backwardly linked" activities associated with the
restaurant industry can be established. While the feasibility
of establishing backwardly linked industries may initially
rest upon the restaurant industry as a basis of support
there is no reason to expect such industries to be strictly
confined to the "Chinese" market. With the accumnilation of
experience such outlets can potentially compete in other
markets as well. Thus if successful such industries can in
effect transform themselves from "non-basic" support indus-
tries into "basic" or "export" industries and in turn create
the necessary environmental conditions for a "second genera-
tion" of support industries.
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4. Food Retailing.
Of all the areas of the Chinese food industry food re-
tailing is by far the most developed. The bulk of the food
retailing business is dominated by the Chinese restaurant
industry. Although the Chinese restaurant industry is already
fairly saturated within the Greater Boston Area by independent
restaurant entrepreneurs there may still be areas which offer
notential investment onportunities. Catering is certainly
one such possibility.
Further investment in the restaurant industry may be made
possible by "product differentiation" which can arise either
through differences in the "product" or differences in "pac-
kaging" the product. To some extent this has already occured.
Chinese restaurants are becoming more specialized in the type
of "product" they offer and in the way they offer it.
Restaurants are now o-nening which specialize in different
"styles" of Chinese cuisine. Although most continue to
specialize in Chinese-American and Cantonese cuisine Mandarin,
Sze Chuan, Hunan, and other regional styles are now being
offered.
"Packaging" comprises another form of product differen-
tiation that may help to expand the market for Chinese food.
Yet to be explored fully are alternative types of restaurant
modes. Cafeteria, smorgasborge, fast food, etc. are other
forms of food servicing which "package" Chinese cuisine for
different markets. A shopping mall, for example, provides
an excellent environment for a fast food form of food ser-
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vicing that have been proven successful in many instances in
California. Other forms of food servicing entirely new to
the Boston market might also be introduced. "Mongolian" or
"dim sum" type restaurants offer an innovative twist in food
servicing. A Chinese seafood restaurant such as the one that
has been recently developed in New York's Chinatown offers
another unique innovation and indicates that greater speciali-
zation among Chinese restaurants can potentially occur.
Further investigation is needed to determine whether such
innovations are capable of actually expanding the market for
Chinese foods or in reality. merely cut into the existing
market. In cases in which it is a combination of both addi-
tional information is needed to determine the extent to which
a new market and the existing market are tapped.
Other Supporting and Miscellaneous Industries.
The presence of a large restaurant base not only allows
backward and forward intergration into other facets of the
food industry to occur but also provides for opportunities
for establishing other support industries unrelated to food.
The establishment of a restaurant supply firm and a just re-
cently established restaurant maintenance and cleaning con-
tracting firm are examples of secondary industries that have
evolved as spinoffs from the restaurant industry. Because a
"critical mass" has been achieved within the restaurant indus-
try other secondary industries may become viable. A few
notential candidates which needs to be investigated include
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rerhaps a management consulting firm, linen service con-
tracting firm, an industry public relations/advertising firm,
and a dry goods supply firm.
As mentioned earlier language and cultural barriers
can be exploited to the advantage of the community. For exam-
ple, one venture enterprise presently under consideration by
the CEDC is the formation of a private school to help prepare
foreign Chinese students for study in the United States. Stu-
dents from Hong Kong or Taiwan who may require preparative
studies in English language or American culture before entering
American colleges and universities can receive such training
from such a school. Any profits generated from such an enter-
prise can then be used to provide scholorships to more needy
indigenous Chinese youths.
The area of foreign trade provides another area of oppor-
tunity for Chinese investment that takes advantage of language
and cultural barriers. Chinese have a natural inside edge
when it comes to foreign trade with Hong Kong or Taiwan. The
first step has already been taken in this area with the esta-
biishment of the Wallant International Trading Company, a joint
venture between various Chinese organizations; domestic and
fore ign.
The opportunties for investment listed so far have been
exclusively tied to "Chinese businesses". Yet to be explored
are investment opportunities in non-chinese ventures. Although
time and space does not allow for a full exploration into this
;rea some observations can be made as to some of the more obvious
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ornortunities that tentatively exist. One area which may hold
some potential oromise is that involving high technology indus-
tries. There are many highly trained Chinese technicians, en-
gineers, and other professionals in the Boston area. Currently
being formed is the Chinese-American Professional Entity (CAPE),
an organization whose purpose will be to pool the talents of
various individual Chinese professionals. One of the func-
tions CAPE hopes to undertake is the development of companies
in the scientific engineering and consulting areas. At the
oresent time a comnuter software companyv is being investigated.
The establ-ishment of professional consulting firms offers an-
other outlet for CAPE talents. Working with the Small Business
Administration (SBA) CAPE can potentially help to establish
minority cnnsulting firms under the SBA 8A program.
There are a number of other investment orrortunities in
non-Chinese orientated ventures, some of which literally "walk
in the door". CEDC has been approached, for example, by a number
of firms wishing to tap the Chinese labor market and capital.
Among some of the proposals CEDC have been approached with include
a joint venture to establish a bank to tap Chinese deposits,
a joint venture to establish a branch plant for the rurpose of
assembling stereo speakers, a joint venture to breed and market
"beefalo", and a joint venture to produce keyboard comnuter caps.
Although not examined here it should nevertheless be noted
that investment in business enterprises may take on the form
of buying out existing businesses.. Such a strategy eliminates
much of the risk and uncertainty involved in opening new busi-
ness ventures.
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Land Development.
For purposes of discussion "land development" will refer
to the development of land within Chinatown Proper to its highest
and best socio-economic use. Land development defined as such
includes a number of activities ranging from construction of
new buildings to conversion and rehabilitation of old buildings
to the development of community infrastructure such as parks,
playgrounds, etc.
Before discussing the potentials for and of land develop-
ment it will first be useful to examine existing land use pat-
terns since existing uses of land will deterriine, to a great
extent, future land use.
The existing, and already proposed, pattern of land use
in and around Chinatown Proper is highly mixed and diverse.
While encompassing a land area of only less than a square mile ,
Chinatown Proper nevertheless contains and abuts a number, of
what often proves to be, incompatible land uses; incompatible
both with respect to the type of activities to be found in the
area and with respect to uses which conflict with Chinese in-
terests. The major land users, other than Chinese, are iden-
tified in Exhibit 19.
In examining, specifically, the Chinese land use pattern
it is evident that commercial, residential, light industrial,
and institutional activities are highly interfused with one
another, especially in the Business and Commercial Core (see
Page 138
Exhibit 25). Here buildings with mixed uses are the rule
rather than the exception. Except for residential land use
most non-residential activities tend to coalesce around the
Chinatown Core. Tn contrast, residential activities are
dispersed throughout Chinatown Proper (with the exception of
the Leather District which contains only a few artist studios).
See Exhibit 26.
As pointed out earlier Chinatown Proper has undergone
numerous changes over the years. Yet the oldest and most
obsolete developments continue to be occupied by Chinese.
Typically Chinese occupy low-rise, three or four story walk-
ups with commercial facilities on the bottom floors and resi-
dential quarters above. Thus, just from the point of view of
physical obsolescence much of the property occupied and/or
owned by Chinese are in serious need of upgrading. Much of
the land which support Chinese activities tend to be under-
utilized by today's standards.
In examining the pattern of land ownership it is apparent
that Chinese control less than half the land in their community.
Chinese owernship of land within the main section of Chinatown
Proper is indicated in Exhibits 27 and 2&
1. Potentials for Land Develo ment.
Many of the activities listed above as potential businesse.
ventures, if ever actually developed, will require "space" as
a necessary input into their business operation. Land develop-
ment to accomodate these new and expanding business concerns
w w w
EXHIBIT 25
CHINESE LAND USE ACTIVITIES
IN THE BUSINESS AND COMUERCIAL CORE
ABBREVIATIONS ,Chinatown Activities
Ground Floor /Upper Level
Activities / Activities
B= Businesses in general
(offices, distributors,
printers, factories, etc.)
R= Restaurants
C= Community Associations
A= Residential Apartments
S= Retail Shops
(Grocery and Gift shops)
Example:
R/A= Restaurant on ground level
and residential apartments on
the upper levels
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EXHIBIT 26
CHINESE RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS
EXHIBIT G
Map of Chinese Residential Patterns
INN
N,
Indicates locations where Chinese reside. This does not indicate
Lwntrh or.Datawere agathered fomsCipecofBostontWardaandpci nListings for 1974. Data is highly suspect due to the data collection
techniques used by the city. However, it can be indicative of
housing patterns. 
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EXHIBIT 28
CHINESE OWNED LAND IN THE RESIDENTIAL EXTENDED AREA*
g..~.hd
STREET
Tufts New
England
Medical
Center
Chinese
Owned
Land
R0AD
*Above the Mass Turnpike
F - ,
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thus becomes another potential area for investment.
Due to agglomeration economies most Chinese commerical
businesses require a central Chinatown location. The lack
of commercial space within the Business and Commercial Core
Area has forced expansion across Harrison Street and the
Southeast Expressway. Redevelopment of the Business Core
is necessary to accomodate new commercial ventures that may
come into being as outlined above.
Likewise Chinese food manufacturing, processing, whole-
saling, and distribution firms will probably also find it
necessary to locate near the central core area asitt is already
the regional distribution center for practically all Chinese
goods. Tentatively it thus appears that tenants can be induced
into the area.
Further impetus for land development is provided by the
intense demand for housing (especially low and moderate income
housing) among Chinese who prefer to reside near the central
Chinatown location. In addition, to the extent that industries
are attracted to the area by its accessibility to major trans-
portation networks (i.e. South Station Terminal, the Mass
Turnpike, and Southeast Expressway); its proximity to public
transit and major finanacial, government, entertainment, and
commercial centers; its low crime rate, and the attractiveness
of its labor force further opportunities are available to the
community to develop its "turf".
Due to the fact that few vacant sites are available for
development land development, for the most part, will have to
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occur through conversion and rehabilitation of existing buildings
and sites. Thus part of any land development strategy will be
to make better and more intense use of land already occupied by
the commuhity. Expansion of the community is impossible except
in one direction - towards the Leather District.
With the decline of the Leather District in recent years
and the subsequent rise in vacancies the possibilities for ex-
pansion have improved. A "wind shield" survey indicates that
as much as 25% of the building space available within the
Leather District lies vacant. A preliminary space survey under-
taken by CEDC reveals that a number of buildings are available
on lease, sale, and rental basis. Most of the buildings are
found to be structurally sound and appropriate for commercial,
light industrial, and office uses; but less so for conversion
into housing. The survey, however, also indicates sky-rocketing
acquisition costs. A great deal of land speculation has taken
place as the area is immediately adjacent to the South Station
Complex. Although Chinese enterprises have located in the area
(i.e. a movie theater, a fortune cookie manufacturer, and a dealer
of restaurant supplies) their numbers are too small to establish
a firm foothold for Chinese expansion into the area. The cost
of building and site acquisition will determine the potentials
for developing the district along lines which serve the interests
of the community.
Due to the problems and costs of relocation land development
must take place on sites where disruption is minimal. As these
sites are developed relocation can then be facilitated and a new
Page 145
round of development initiated. There are potentially three
or four sites within the immediate vicinity of Chinatown Proper
which are potentially developable and which involves minimal
relocation of existing tenants. These sites are indicated in
Exhibit 29. Development of most of these sites are now in the
process of being negotiated between Chinese representatives and
the owners.
The feasibility of land develonment in the BCC depends
upon both economic and political considerations. From the
economic persrective notentials for land development is dernen-
dent u-on both the demand for and supnly of various tynes of
snace at different "rent" levels. In the case of demand it,
in turn, is influenced by: 1) the locational advantages of
a Chinatown Prorer location as opposed to other sites, 2) incen-
tives (disincentives) that exist to induce (discourage) tenancy
in the community, and 3) the quantity and quality of snace
available and its price (rent). Factors influencing suonly
include: 1) the rent level the area can support for a given
quantity and quality of space, 2) cost of producing space of
a particular level of quantity and quality , and 3)
regulations restricting the use of land (i.e. zoning).
Modifying, and -perhaps even overshadowing, economic con-
sideration are socio-olitical considerations. From the socio-
political vantage point land development will be very much
influenced by the community's ability and power to control land
use within its geographic domain. It is rrimarily due to poli-
tical considerations, for example, that the community has been
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EXHIBIT 29
PRIORITY SITES FOR DEVELOPMENT
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able to keep encroaching competing users of land at bay.
The ability of the community to work on a political level;
in acquiring government subsidies, property tax relief,
development rights, and veto 'ower over what developments
can take place within the boundaries of the community thus has
beenand will continue to be, an important factor in deter-
mining potentials for community land development.
Trade offs between economic, political, and social
considerations must thus be taken into account in determining
the feasibility of any one development project. To state,
a priori, what these trade offs are and the potentials for
land developlment is impossible. What can be said, however,
is that the community in undertaking the role of land developer
will have many more alternatives open to it than are available
to nrivate developers if only because profit is not the over=
riding, singular consideration in determining the desirability
of a project.
While it may not be entirely possible to identify exactly
what projects may be potentially feasible there is no doubt that
land development can and must be undertaken. The only real ques-
is whether land development can occur in a fashion beneficial to
the community.
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2. Potentials of Land Development to Alter the Community's
Spatial Structure.
"Chinese" urban sprawl, as was noted earlier, is a con-
tinuing phenomenon that distinguishes the BCC from other ur-
ban ghettoes. The uniqueness of the BCC's "urban form" has
an appreciable impact on economic develonment and visa versa.
This interaction arises from the fact that economic
activities must locate in space. Where they locate will
largely be influenced by existing (and in turn will influence
future) location and density patterns of resident-ial and non-
residential activities. Therefore in undertaking economic
develonment not only must careful consideration be given to
what type of economic activities should be developed but also
to where they should be developed. Because it has an important
affect on the comrunity's spatial structure land development
can play an imuortant role in reshaping what many consider to
be undesirable "Chinese" urban sprawl.
The present community spatial structure is deemed to be
undesirable for several reasons. First, it is not conducive
to social cohesion of the community. Scattered in little
pockets here and there many Chinese are unable to particirate
in the in a full communal life they have been accustomed to.
Chinese living in Cambridge or Brookline lack a sense of
community. They are prevented from settling in the preferred
central Chinatown location where Chinese goods and social
services are readily available because of the lack of housing.
Secondly, it is not conducive to tourism which is the
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mainstay of the economies of other Chinatowns. Boston's
Chinatown because it is such a small indistinctive enclave
lacks the drawing power which makes other Chinatowns a focal
point for tourism. Unable tc. grow and expand it has failed
to develop the critical mass in population and activites
necessary to make it a major center of attraction. Instead
Boston's Chinatown closely resembles a declining central
city. Like many such cities Boston's Chinatown has become
an increasingly less Aimportant employment center, houses an
increasingly poorer segment of the Chinese population, and is
struggl ing to maintain its viabil ity.
Thirdly, the present community's snatial structure .inhi-
bits the immediate creation of a number of indigenous popula-
tion serving industries identified in Exhibit 22. The number
of such industries are probably considerably less than might
have occured had the community developed in a more consolidated
manner. The absence of such enternrises renresents a serious
"money and job drain" from the community.
Lastly, the disnersed spatial pattern of the BCC creates
tremedous inconveniences for many Chinese who must commute
to Chinatown to purchase Chinese goods and/or to work (even
Chinese restaurant workers who work in suburban restaurants must
commute to Chinatown in order to get rides to work). The elderly
who are less mobile are of course affected the most.
In counteracting these negative influences of "Chinese"
urban sprawl a strategy of concentrating economic development
activities in the existing core is necessary. Such a strategy
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however, only makes sense if there is space to accomodate
new and expanding activities. Land Development, as the pro-
cess through which various types and quantities of tspace"
are produced, thus becomes a critical factor in making such
a strategy work.
3. Land Development as a Route to Economic Development.
Land development cannot be divorced from economic develop-
ment and may in fact be the primary route through which econo-
mic development is achieved. housing development, industrial
parks, and commercial developments are among some of the land
development activities that have, in the past, been generated
by local community development agents. Althougho land develop-
ment is not necessarily an easy means to achieve economic
development it can be effective. Ronald George describes,
for example, the success of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration
Corporation (a federally funded Community Development Corpora-
tion) in the area of housing development;
"The impact which the home improvement program-has had,
on beautifying the immediate neighborhood and genera-
ting jobs and training for the unskilled and unemployed
(reaching some of the structurally unemployed) has been
significant. For example, between the years of 1967
and 1972 2,447 houses (in 61 city blocks) had been re-
furbished- and 2,855 employees had been trained through
the $3,100,000 program. The impact which the rehab pro-
gram has had on the area's development has also been
significant. At the end of 1973, Bedford-Stuyvesant
Restoration rehabilitated 100 units (50 buildings) in
addition to another 500 units in the process of renova-
tion...Their renovation not only supplied jobs and
training, but also, provided opportunities for small
contractors, craftsman, and suppliers of services in the
Bed-Sty area." 2 0
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Land development, as the above illustration demostrates
impacts upon economic development in several important res-
pects. First, it can play an important role in upgrading
the physical quality of the neighborhood. Secondly, land
development can provide jobs for the local workforce. Thirdly,
land development can act positively to help local residents and
the community to gain control over the community's turf. By
gaining control and ownership of its turf the community benefits
by; 1) reducing the drain on capital that results from the pay-
ment of rents to outside absentee landownezm and 2) building up
equity in the form of property ownership. Finally, land develop-
ment can potentially provide a source of income in the form of
rents to the community with which the community can invest in
other activities.
There is, however, one major drawback to land development
when applied to the BOO. The fact there are no Chinese general
contractors nor sub-contractors the potential iof land development
to provide work for local residents will be limited. Although
Chinese are now beginning to enter the construction trades their
experience is limited. Thus much of the work that is generated
by land development must be contracted out to outside firms.
On the other hand, the fact that the community becomes the developer
some leverage might be exercised to encourage outside building
firms to hire and train Chinese. Caremhowever, must be taken to
insure that training cost do not inflate the cost of land development
to an exorbitant amount inaorday not to jeapordize the viability
of a project.
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Criteria for Selecting Investment Projects.
Given that the range of invesment opportunities cover
as broad a spectrum as described above and given the fact
that limited resources restrict the number of investments
a PCED development agent can select to invest, the task
arises of assigning priorities to the array of investment
opportrnities. For a private investor the task is relatively
easy. Profitability and risk are essentially the basic cri-
teria by which a private individual selects investments.
For a PCED development agent the task is considerably more
difficult since multiple objectives and considerations must
be taken into account. Complicating the task is the fact
that criteria for project selection are not just rooted in
economic considerations of efficient use of resources but in
political and social considerations as well. Trade offs
between economic, social, and political considerations is
esrecially difficult to assess given that they lack a common
denominator and therefore are not easily quantifiable.
In selecting criteria by which to judge and rate potential
irvestments Thomas Vietorisz and Bennett Harrison offer five
categories of basic qualitative considerations. They are
described by their Vietorisz and Harrison as follows: 21
1) Considerations of "TechnoJogy Training, and rrowth".
"There is a continuing debate among theoretical develop-
ment economists concerning the rroper level of techno-
logy that should be introduced in a developing area.
The traditional argnment favors a labor-intensive tech-
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nology, since t~his will ensure the optimal utiliza-
tion of scarce investment resources. At the other
extreme is the argument that favors the introduction
of a high-level, capital-intensive techrology for at
least three reasons. First, this argument asserts
that labor-intensive technolog-ies in practice tend to
be archaic, second...laboreintensive technology...
freezes the structure of productioi into a pattern
of low labor productivity which prevents growth and
finally, it advocates rapid growth by means of a high
rate of saving and reinvestment...
...What will matter most in evaluating a major pro-
ject is ('hot) the initial level of technical so-
phistication or capital-labor intensity, but the
expected rate of advance in these characteristics
over the life of the project. Given a goal. of rapid
economic growth, a high priority should be attached
to those branches of economic activity that are
capable of powerful advances in technology, sk:ills,
and organization, even if it should be necessary to
start projects with relatively low levels of the
above characteristics."
2). "Distribution and Marketing Considerations.
"Tn most industries it is still true that whoever
controls distribution and marketing will be able
to capture the major share of available profits.
Under oligopoly, the ability of a firm to carture
profits depends on its ability to maintain--
together with other oligopolistic producers--
effective barriers to new entry. Economies of
scale in production are no longer the dominant
barrier.'.economies of ~cale in establishing and-
maintaining a dealership network or economies of
scale in advertising function as key barriers.
Production can be largely taken for granted in
many lines: given a distribution system, there
are always sources from which a supply of mer-
chandise can be readily procured. Finance is a
problem only for smaller or for rapidly exnanding
enterprises. Given these institutional conditions,
one way of identifying ghetto development projects
with a reasonable profit potential, or at least a
survival ability, is to focus on the role of the
distribution system."
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3. "Balarce- Economic Base" Considerations.
"A useful, though limited, project selection criterion
concerns a balance in the economic base of an area.
If a survey reveals important gaps in this base, this
constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of supplying
the missing activities...provided that we can identify
and remove the social and economic factors that have
given rise to the gap in the first place."
4. "Labor Intensity and Project Profitability.
"Projects that generate large amounts of employment are
favored for ghetto development if their skill distri-
bution and training adaptability are suitable,, fol-
lowing the first criterion developed above...
The inherently limited profits associated with labor-
intensive projects are less of a barrier to community-
shonsored .hetto development institutions- than they are
for large commercial corporations since, in the case of
the former,. the largest part of the payoff does not
(or should not) come from profits but from external
effects such as the creation of large amounts of employ-
ment with proper skill-level distributions and training
opportunities...activities that are inherently labor-
intensive...might open up significant opportunities for
the sale )f ghetto-produced commodities and services to
outside areas, without being exposed to strong competi-
tion from powerful and well-established enterprises.
5. Considerations of "Other External Economies and
Diseconomies.
"Our oualitative project selection criteria are all
aimed at capturing community benefits that are not
reflected. in tprns of conventional resource-allo-
cation criteria...Tn this section we survey three
additional classes of externalities having to do
with employment, community service, and pollution.
..,as far as the kind of employment is concerned,
we favor projects with assorted skill levels that
lend themselves to the establishment of training
activities linked to career ladders, and we specifi-
cally reject projects that offer low-grade, poorly
paying, dead jobs, in whatever number... A project
rates low if there is an exnectation that the jobs
will not accrue nrimarily to ghetto residents but
to outsiders who commute into the ghetto.
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Raising the quality and reducing the prices of locally
consumed commodities and services results in important
community benefits.
Air rollution, noise, and the generation of taxic waste
are clear cases of external diseconomies that should be
scored against a given project. Closely related to
pollution are the effects of cgrowding, particularly in
regard to transport.. Projects that lead to large ship-
ments and time-consuming loading and unloading operations
are likely to create traffic jams and are thus rated
lower than their commercial profitability would otherwise
suggest."
The criteria, -as developed by Vietorisz and Harrison,
while sound on theoretical grounds need not be necessarily
the deciding factorsas both Vietorisz and Harrison readily
admit. "Tactical" criteria rather than purely "merit" criteria
willin practioe, be the more likely ultimate deciding factors;
"actual implementation may depend on concrete opportunities
rather than theoretical preferences; the first project to be
implemented is often the one for which a sponsor can be found
22
immediately." Criteria can also change over time. In the
early stages of PCED the development agent may choose to stress
profitability above all other criteria in order to achieve its
immediate short-term goal of assuring its own survival. Later,
if the development agent becomes self-sustaining, merit eriteria
maeyl be given increasingly greater weight in project selection.
The criteria, as developed above, will also be modified by
certain cultural biases of the Chinese. The fact that there
may be a strong predisposition among Chinese towards self-
employment implies criteria which give greater emphasis to pro-
jects which offer entrepreneurial opportunities.
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CHAPTER IX: POTENTIALS FOR FINANCING POED
Investment resources are what fuel economic development.
Until such resources are acquired potentials for economic
develonment remain just that, potentials. Given that the
community, as an entity in itself, does not earn any income
and does not own any surplus generating captial enterprises
the question arises, where are the necessary investment re-
sources to come from to finance PCED? From whom is the com-
munity going to acquire the necessary land, capitalequipment,
labor. or capital funds (i.e. money with which all three can
be acquired) and how? Some tentative answers are provided
below.
1. Land Acouisition.
Presently practically all the land within Chinatown Proper
are held in private hands. A few scattered sites however are
held by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA). Although
;lot likely it is conceivable that the BRA might be willing
to turn over these sites to the community if the community
can demonstrate its capacity to develon them. Should the
community acquire these lands then such lands can become a
source of investment equity for the community. There exist
two other processes by which the community might be able to
acquire land. One involves using the City's eminent domain
power to acquire land from private owners. Ideally such lands
could then be turned over to the community or more realistically
Page 157
purchased at a reduced cost. Such a strategy, however, does
not anpear to be a viable one. The other alternative involves
seeking a joint partnership or some kind lease-hold agreement
with existing land owners. The right to develop property
gives the community some leverage in. getting financing. This
alternative appears to be the most feasible especially where
land in the Chinatown Core Area is involved since the community
exercises a powerful voice over developments which occur within
tlhe boundaries of this area.
2. Acquisition of Capital Equipment.
Direct acquisition of capital equipment or "contributions
in kind" as they shall be referred to in the context of this
discussion,are also difficult to come by. Contributions in
kind are available from a few sources. The General Service
Administration, for example, often has surplus equipment which
are available to non-profit organizations at no cost. Private
Corporations and other large institutions are other potential
sources. Donations of Dlant eauipment, use of facilities, etc..
not only allow corporations to improve their "public image"
but can be deducted from their corporate taxes as well. CEDC
has discovered that contributions in kind can be an imoortant
source of equity for the community. Not only has CEDC been
able to acquire free office snace from the Chinese Merchants
Association but free office equipment (on loan) and free
comuuter time from Tufts and a comruter from Wancs Lab Tnc.
Acquiring such contributions in kind allows the community to
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free resources for other uses.
3. Acauisition of Labor (Sweat Equity).
Perhans the only kind of equity that the community itself
can raise is "sweat eouity". "Sweat equity", however, can
be only substituted for other investment resuurces to a limited
extent. Nevertheless it represent, an important resource which
can free money that otherwise might go to hire staff or to
hire-exnensive consultanta. Community residents are the most
likely source of such equity. The donation of their time is
not only imnortant to the economic development process but to
the social and nolitical development processes as well. Pro-
fessional organizations, private corporations, and public
officials can also provide "sweat eauity" in the form of free
consultation. Another major source of "sweat enuity" are
colleges and universities that abound in the area. Students
and rrofessors can often tie their schoolwork into working in
a real life community setting. "Sweat equity" (should also
be noted) can be used to leverage funds from the federal govern-
ment who often allow, as part of the community's matching funds,
the imnuted value of volunteer time.
4. Acquisition of Carital Funds.
Raising equity directly in the form of land, capital
equipment, and labor will not likley be sufficient to generate
meaningful PCED if only becausd they are not easily convertible
to other tves of assets. Because of its liquidity money is
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the preferred type of investment resource.
Acouiring "cash" eauity to finance meaningful PCED is
a difficult task as sources for such equity is severely limited.
There are essentially two - sources and two means from
and with which the community can raise equity capital funds.
It can either raise it "internally" by seeking donations or
loans from community residents, businesses, and institutions
or it can seek to raise it "externally" by seeking funds in the
form of grants and loans from private and public institutions
exogenous to the community. Raising equity canital funds from
the community is not likely to generate sufficient funds, if
only because ghettoes by nature suffer from a captial shortage.
The only sources, therefore, which are likely to have the ne-
cessary quantity of funds which PCED requires are outside pri-
vate and rublic institutions.
Currently the primary funding source for PCED appears to
the Federal Governmenti. Title VIIgof the original Office of
Economic Opportunity's (OE.O) Special Impact Program has to
date provided $121,744,000 in funding to 18 urban Community
23
Develorment Corporations (CDC). Administered today by the
Community Service Administration (CSA) the Special Imoact
Program has become essentially the only aource available for
funding new PCED activities on an equity basis. The Ford Foun-
dation which was once in the forefront of the CDC movement no
longer is willing to rrovide equity funds for new CDCs.
Access to Federal CDC funds is now being sought by the
Chinese Economic Development Council which has anmlied to CSA
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for special designation as a Federally funded CDC. Should
CEDC's application be accepted it will be eligible to receive a
$150,000 Planning Grant after which an Operational Grant of
as much as $1,000,000 may be forthcoming. CEDC's arrlication
rrovosal is still pending and is not exnected to decided upon
until at least June, 1976.
Should CEDC fail to acquire CSA funds PCED of the BCC
will be severely hampered. Without eauity carital funds the
community's ability to leverage loans and grants from private
and public sources and to induce private investors adI invest-
ment entities to take an eauity position in CDC projects and
ventures will be greatly inhibited.
On the other hand,should CSA funding' he forthcoming a
Chinese CDC will have many more oitions open to it in leveraging
other funds. A whole host of federal programs will then be
more accesible as well will be a number of nrivate sources.
Some of the more major sources of funds (i.e. equity, loans,
grants, etc) are identified in Exhibit 30g Each of these
sources provides different types of capital. EDA, for example,
provides grants for technical assistance (but requires matching
funds) and is also a source for long term loans. (see Exhibit 30).
In reviewing the various funding sources available to
fund PCED activities it will be useful to point out other
development-finance entities that are being developed by
various factions of the BCC. These entities will, if fully
developed, have the capacity to play a very substantial and
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EXHITBIT 30
FLOW OF
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF FUNDS
TO. FINANCE PCE
State
Govt.
MFHA
CDFCO
OPS
DCA
NERCOM
Private Federal
Individuals Govt.
and
Institutions
SBI C SBA
LjDC
Private
Financial
Institutions / H/1
DOL
EDA
Local
Devej-pment
'Agent
(CDC)
* Not inclueive of all funding sources
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EXHTBIT 31
EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF FUNDING AVAILABLE
Primary Sources of Funding1
Purpose for
which financing
is needed
Social Serrice
Programs
(i. e. bilingual
education)
Human Capital
Development
(i.e. manpower
training )
Business
Development
(i.e. venture
enterprise
investment)
Land Develop-
ment
(i.e. housing)
Local State
ABCD
Federal
HEW
CS&
SMSC
EOHS
DCA
NERCOM
CFDC
OPS
CBG OPS
DPW
DP&R
Private
FOUNDATIONS
DOL
EDA
EDA(*)
CSA
SBA(*)
MESBIC
BANKS(*
SBIC
LDC (*)
HUD(*) BANKS(*)
(*) = debt financing
Not inclusive of all funding sources
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important role in complementing and reinforcing PCED. Each is
briefly described below. 24
a) Chinese Merchants Association (CMA).
The CMA is a non-profit, privately funded corpora-
tion (essentially a Chinese "Chamber of Commerce").
It is one of the oldest and more traditional
Chinese organizations and was one of the first to
concern itself with enhancing the social and econo-
mic welfare of its members and the community. Du-
ring the course of its 70 year history the Associa-
tion has involved itself in a number of activities,
ranging from providing low-income housing to com-
munity residents to contributing to various social
and cultural clubs as well as events. It also pro-
vides a forum for local Chinese businessmen to dis-
cuss issues related to local economic and business
conditions and as such acts as an important center
for generating new business ideas and in bringing
individual businessmen together to develop these
ideas. Membership dues plus--other sources of in-
come provide the Association with its primary
source of revenue with which it conducts its acti-
vities.
b) Chinese Local Development Cornoration (CLDC).
The CLDC is a for-profit cornoration initiated
by the CMA in 1974. Tt consists of nrivate
investors throughout the Boston Chinese Com-
mturni.ty. It is set un as a Small Business
Administration (SBA) local develooment
corporation to provide long-term debt financing
to minority businesses for plant and equipment.
c) Chinese Economic Development Council (CEDC).
The CEDC is a non-profit corporation funded by
Economic Development Administration to enhance
and promulgate economic development in the BCC.
It's primary objective is to provide technical
assistance to Chinese businesses and to initiate
economic development activities. Among its pre-
sent activities include assisting businesses in
acauii ing loans and technical consultation, re-
search in community problems and potential solu-
tions, comnunicating with outside agencies in an
"outreach" effort, conveying business education
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and consumer news, through radio and newletters,
to community businesses and residents, etc. In
addition CEDC has pending applications for a
fedprally fundep CDC.
d) Chinese-American Investment Corporation (CAIC).
Presently pending approval from the SBA is a
Chinese Small Business Investment Company (SBIC).
CAIC is a for-profit corporation with private
investors. It will be able to leverage SBA funds
in providing equity funds, long term loans, and
management assistance to minority owned small
businesses.
e) Chinese Owned Bank.
The establishment of Chinese bank is presently
being considered. Each of the organizations men-
tioned above are involved in the olanning and
development of such an entity. The bank was
conceived as a means of meeting certain financial
needs of the community residents and businesses
which are not being adequately met by existing
banking institutions.
f) Chinese-American Professional Entity (CAPE)
Also in the development stages is CAPE, a non-
profit corporation. Its mission is to develop a
talent pool of Chinese professionals in the
Greater Boston area to assist the social and
economic welfare of the Chinese-American com--
munity. As a source of "sweat equity" CAPE
will provide free professional consultation
to non-profit organizations on matters related
to technical and managerial questions. It
will also aetetbutilize its talent pool to
set up for-profit subsidiaries. It will in-.
addition-aid Chinese consulting firms in ac-
ouiring consulting contracts under the SBA
8-A "set aside" program.
Together these develooment entities form a formiable
network of economic development centers that have the capa-
city to mobilize resources in facilitating community economic
development. Each is unique in that each caters to different
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needs and employ different strategies in the implementation of
economic development.
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PROSPECTUS
Accepting the premise that Planned Community Economic
Development is indeed the appropriate and most viable response
to the problems confronting the BCC the question arises whether
or not the BCC is actually capable of undertaking a concerted
program of PCED. The answer to this question is almost entirely
dependent upon the availability of funds with which to finance
PCED. Practically the only source from which equity capital
can be gotten is the Federal Government. It is the Federal
Government that the BCC must therefore base its hopes upon.
"Better late than never" is an appropriate expression in
describing the Boston Chinese Community's present attempt to
jump on, what may well be, the "tail end" of the CDC Oband
wagon". Although the BCC has a great deal in its favor the i
times are such that acquiring Federal funds to sponsor a Chinese
CDC in Boston will be, at best, difficult. A period of entrench-
ment is taking place as programs generated under the old Office
of Economic Opportunity (OEO) fight to hold the line against
cutbacks and dissolutionment. The era of mass movements and
urban unrest which gave impetus to the CDC movement no longer
prevails. Problems of the ghetto which were once in the fore-
front of public attention now take a back seat to problems
related to energy, inflation, and recession.
The concept of PCED which underlies the CDC strategy itself
is now being challenged; by local governments jealous of CDCs'
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"paragovernmental" status; by private enterprise who contend
that CDCs should not be allowed to use public funds for purpose
of establishing businesses which compete with existing private
firms; and by social activists who argue that the "CDCs and
other program oriented organizations tend to curb activist
politics by concentrating on bureaucratic problems". 25
Although the times are not as auspicious as they were five
or six years ago the prospects of the Federal Government funding
a Chinese CDC are favorable if only because an ethnic balance
among CDCs is desired. The Chinese community has a great many
assets which also makes it an attractive candidate. It still
maintains a positive, although stereotype,image; a strong mer-
cantilistic tradition, a highly marketable culture, etc.
Whether the BCC will be the first Chinese community to receive
CDC funding only time will tell. One thing is clear, however,
without federal aid PCED of the BOO will suffer a serious
setback from which it will not likely recover.
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FOOT NOTES
1. Edwin Gooding, economist add director of Urban Finance
of the Federal Reserve Board.
2. Each of the communities mentioned were targets of urban
renewal. Each of these once lively communities have
been transformed into commercial centers which cater
primarily to tourist. Previous residents relocated
by dispersing themselves to other areas.
3. Hirshmann, Albert. The Strategy of Economic Development
New Haven Yale University Press, 1956, p. 56.
4. See Sampan April 1976, p. 7.
5. CEDO estimate.
6. Dietz, Jean. "Mung Beans Sprout Money", Boston Globe;
7. Wong, William. "Wall Street Journal;
February 6, 197.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Dietz. op. cit.
14.. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Leong, William. Quoted from CDC proposal.
17. CEDO estimate.
18. CEDC estimate.
19. Hua Sang; November 1975, P.1 -
20. George, Ronald. "Strategies for Black Community
Development" M.o.P. Thesis, Department of Urban
Studies and Planning, M.I.T., 1975.
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21. Vietorisz, Thomas and Harrison, Bennett.,op. cit.,
p. 80-100.
22. Ibid.
23. Center for Community Economic Development Newsletter,
March 1976.
24. Described in CEDC's; "Economic Strategies Update",
March 1976.
25. Nakamoto, Takuya. "The Politieal Edonomy of
Community Development Corporations: A Background
Paper." for the Institute for Urban and Regional
Development; Berkeley, Calif., 1975.
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